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the protestors' imprisonment contravened prov1s1ons of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.232 The Commission issued its decision in 
May of 1980. Although it gently chastised the British Government for its 
intransigence,233 the Commission denied the legitimacy of the prisoners' 
claims. The decision is important in that its deconstruction indicates four 
things: first, that legal authorities, in making decisions, not only 
delegitimize some practices, they legitimize others; secondly, that the 
Commissioners operated upon a liberal humanist conception of the 
"subject", and that this resulted in a "blame the victim" approach; thirdly, 
that the Commissioners subjected the plaintiff prisoners to what Lyotard has 
called the injustice of the "double bind"; and fourthly, that the Com­
missioners exercised a gratuitous "will to power" that served to silence the 
"other." 
First, I will consider the argument that juridical decision-making is a 
form of legitimation and delegitimation. Conventionally, when com­
mentators approach decisions of human rights organizations, the framework 
of analysis tends to be that such bodies serve an essentially regulative role, 
that is, that their function is to operate as a check upon the abuse of power 
by states against their citizens. In other words, the assumed paradigm is that 
the function of human rights organizations is the delegitimation of states 
that infringe human rights. However, as Hegel notes: 
Whal is "familiarly known" is nol properly known, just for the reason that it 
is "familiar." When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest 
form of self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume 
something to be familiar, and to let it pass on that very account.234 
Drawing on this insight, I will argue that the conventional assumption 
reveals only half the story, because the effect - if not the intention - of 
a determination by a human rights organization such as the Commission 
against a plaintiff is to legitimize repressive state practices. 
To be more specific, when, for example, the European Commission was 
discussing the standard of "inhuman and degrading treatment" within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, it emphasized that to be 
sanctionable, the "ill-treatment must attain a minimal level of severity ... a 
particular level" which was "relative" depending upon "all the circum­
stances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the 
victim."235 It seems to me that such propositions not only signal an 
embracement of flexibility that allows for a great deal of leeway in statist 
232 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature, Nov. 4th 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted 1950 Y.B.H.R. 418. 
Application No. 8317/78. 
233 McFeely, supra note 151 at 86. 
234 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967) at 127. 
235 McFeely, supra note 151 at 79, 88, 89. 
46 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 1994 
abuse, it also positively legitimizes any abuse up to that elusive level.236 It 
sanctifies an acceptable level of state violence and, in so doing, has the 
effect of encouraging continued state domination and abuse. 237 
Moreover, in this case not only did the Commission legitimize certain 
practices of domination, it helped to undermine the integrity of at least one 
plaintiff by gratuitously referring to his past: "In 1974 the applicant ... 
blasted his way out of Portlaiose prison, near Dublin."238 What, precisely, 
is the relevance of a plaintiff's prior history of escape in a different country 
(Ireland) when the complaint is one of abuse by the British state? The only 
function that such an unnecessary reference can serve is to reinforce the 
juridical construction of the "terrorist" - the modem day folk devil - and 
therefore to justify his or her criminalization and incarceration. 
Secondly, the Commission rested its decision on a liberal humanist 
conception of the subject and therefore issued a "blame-the-victim" type 
decision. Much of the plaintiffs' argument was based upon Article 3 of the 
Convention, claiming that the physical conditions of their imprisonment 
constituted "inhuman and degrading treatment." The trump card played by 
the Commission in dismissing the claim was the rather obvious assertion 
that the conditions of which they complained were freely chosen by the 
prisoners,239 that they were "self-imposed deprivations",240 "self-inflicted 
debasement and humiliation",241 in short "their own responsibility."242 From 
the perspective of the Commission, the prisoners were masters of their own 
destiny. 
This is an important argument, also often applied to the hunger strike: 
that it was suicide. However, to analyse the Commission's ascription of 
responsibility, it is necessary to temporarily depart from the juridical level 
to address the issue at the ontological level. 
As I will argue in Part IV, B, there are at least three competing 
conceptions of the self: the sovereign ( or liberal) self; the situated ( or 
relational) self; and the saturated ( or postmodern) self. The postmodern or 
saturated conception of the self will not be addressed at this point. A liberal 
humanist ontology, premised as it is upon the idea of a sovereign and 
solitary individual, argues that "man [sic] is the master and possessor of the 
totality of his actions and ideas."243 A situated or relationalist ontology 
argues that the subject is a dynamic and self-reflexive potential influenced, 
though not determined, by a matrix of societal and cultural forces.244 
236 For example, the Commission acknowledges that a "restrictive diet..though harsh does 
not amount to a sufficiently rigorous punishment...amount(ing) to inhuman or degrading 
punishment", id. at 89. The analysis adopted by the Commission is highly reminiscent 
of Diplock's legitimation of abuse during interrogation. Diplock Report, supra note 145. 
237 It should also be noted that the Commission uncritically endorses the recommendations 
of the Gardiner Committee, supra note 147, on several occasions, id. at 81, 100. 
238 Supra note 151 at 47. 
239 Id. at 84. 
240 Id. at 80. 
241 Id. at 81. 
242 Id. at 83. 
243 L. Ferry & A. Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism, 
trans. M. Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) at xvi. 
244 See infra Part IV, B. 
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These competing conceptions of the self engender alternative conceptions 
of the self's "responsibility" for its actions. Within the liberal humanist 
approach, given that the self is an autonomous and self-possessed 
individual, the question of responsibility is relatively straightforward: the 
sovereign self is responsible for his or her actions, subject, perhaps, to 
certain very limited exceptions such as insanity or infancy.245 Clearly, this 
dovetails with the Commission's response to the prisoners' claims: it was 
their choice; responsibility was grounded in and emanated from the total 
self. 
The situated or relational approach considers the question of 
responsibility to be much more complex because it demands a contextual 
inquiry into both the self and the circumstances that give rise to his or her 
actions. Thus, responsibility does not inhere, or automatically originate, in 
the a priori subject. Rather, responsibility is a cultural, social, moral and 
juridical attribution following upon the weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances. Consequently, in relation to the prisoners' claim that the 
conditions of their imprisonment were "inhuman and degrading", I would 
argue that it is crucial to consider their subjectivities, their "legal 
sensibilities" as well as the "legal sensibility" of the state. In this light, I 
would then propose that responsibility lay with both sides, that it was 
"shared." Such an approach recognizes the agentic capacities and 
responsibilities of the self, but at the same time avoids a legal formalism 
and vulgar ontology that blinds us to people's existential realities. More­
over, a relational approach to responsibility may help to avoid zero-sum 
thinking246 which encourages the kind of polarization that can lead to such 
tragedies as the hunger strike. And it certainly enables us to avoid blaming 
the victim. 247 
Thirdly, the foregoing discussion of the prisoners' "choice" leads to a 
consideration of the Commissioner's decision as a manifestation of the 
Lyotardian "double-bind." As discussed earlier, Lyotard rejects ideas of 
consensus or the feasibility of a grundnorm. He considers justice to be the 
proliferation of mini-narratives and multiplicity, the embracement of 
disputation and dissensus, the acceptance of paralogy.248 Injustice, in 
245 It might be noted that such an approach makes juridical decision-making relatively 
uncomplicated: there is a primafacie and a priori assumption of individual responsibility 
unless extenuating circumstances indicate otherwise. 
246 The Commissioners determined that, "they [the prisoners] alone must bear responsibility 
for the choice they have made." McFeely, supra note 151 at 84 [emphasis added]. Two 
further points may be worth noting. Sinn Fein, translated into English, means "ourselves 
alone", and why not, one might ask, given such juridical antipathy? Secondly, such a 
unilateral ascription of responsibility -inevitably encouraged the British government as 
to the righteousness of its intransigence. As a consequence, I would argue, in accordance 
with my relational thesis of responsibility, that the Commissioners' decision makes them, 
in part, responsible for the subsequent fast and deaths. This is also why I talk about "the 
Commissioners" rather than some abstract "Commission". 
247 At a minimum, such a proposal would prevent the Commissioners from solipsistically 
endorsing the recommendations of the Gardiner Committee, supra note 147 at 81, 100, 
and instead, inquire to what extent such a Report constitutes part of the problem, rather 
than part of the solution. 
248 See supra note 68. 
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Lyotard's account, is the assumption that the claims of "the other" can be 
translated into the "language game" or "genre" of the dominant narrative, 
thereby excluding as irrational, unfounded or unbelievable that which is not 
translatable. In such a situation, the plaintiff is deprived of a narrative, the 
right to tell her or his story: 
This is what a wrong [tort] would be: a damage [dommage] accompanied by 
the loss of the means to prove the damage. This is the case if the victim is 
deprived of life, or of all his or her liberties, or of the freedom to make his 
or her ideas or opinions public, or simply of the right to testify of the 
damage, or even more simply if the testifying phrase itself is deprived of 
authority . ... In all of these cases then, to the privation constituted by the 
damage there is added the impossibility of bringing it to the knowledge of 
others, and in particular to the knowledge of a tribunal. Should the victim 
seek to bypass this impossibility and testify anyway to the wrong done to him 
or her, he or she comes up against the following argumentation: either the 
damages you complain about never took place, and your testimony is false; 
or else they took place, and since you are able to testify to them, it is not a 
wrong that has been done to you, but merely a damage, and your testimony 
is still false.249 
Thus, we encounter one aspect of "the dilemma of difference", 250 the double 
bind in which "the defining feature of a wrong is that it cannot be proven"251 
because it is unintelligible within the dominant adjudicative model. Lyotard 
explains: 
Either you are a victim of a wrong, or you are not. If you are not, you are 
deceived (or lying) in testifying that you are. If you are, since you can bear 
witness to this wrong, it is not a wrong, and you are deceived (or lying) in 
testifying that you are the victim of a wrong. Let p be: you are the victim of 
a wrong; not-p: you are not; Tp: phrase p is true; Fp: it is false. The argument 
is: either p or not-p; if not-p, then Fp; if p, then not-p, then Fp. The ancients 
called this argument a dilemma. It contains the mechanism of the double bind 
as studied by the Palo Alto school, it is a linchpin of Hegelian dialectical 
logic .... This mechanism consists in applying two contradictory propositions, 
p and not p, two logical operators: exclusion (either ... , or) and implication 
(if. .. then). So, at once [(either p or not-p) and (if p, then not-p)]. It's as if you 
said both, either it is white, or it is not white; and if it is white, it is not 
white. 252 
Applying these propositions to the McFeely decision, the double bind 
within which the Commission entrapped the prisoners was that if the latter 
249 Differend, supra note 70 at 5. 
250 Supra note 227 at 20. 
251 G. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988) at 143. 
252 Differend, supra note 70 at 5-6. 
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wanted to remain consistent with their political ideology by claiming to be 
political prisoners or prisoners of war, then they could not come within the 
parameters of the European Convention. Thus, in order to secure the 
protective mantle of the Convention, they would have to abandon their 
political convictions and acknowledge that they were "ordinary decent 
prisoners." However, in that case, they would have nothing to complain 
about because they would then simply be unruly and disruptive prisoners 
whose punishments were "necessary in a democratic society for the 
prevention of disorder or crime", 253 and justifiable "in the interests of public 
safety."254 Like troscead/cealathan the prisoners' claims were simply 
"untranslatable" into the dominant juridical discourse. In short, "[i ]tis in the 
nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a 
wrong. "255 The Commissioners failed to heed the appeal to alterity, they 
refused to listen. 
Fourth, and finally, the Commissioners' decision manifests a juridico­
bureaucratic "will to power." In many ways, the core of the prisoners' 
demand was contained in their invocation of Article 9 of the Convention 
which provides, in part, that "everyone has the right to freedom of 
conscience and religion."256 But, by inverse logic, this is the argument to 
which the Commission gives the shortest shrift. The prisoners argued that 
their conscience and belief in their prisoner of war status should be 
recognized as protected under this provision through a recognition of 
"special category status." The Commissioners' response is dazzling in its 
certitude: 
The Commission is of the opinion that the right to such a preferential status 
for a certain category of prisoner is not amongst the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention or by Article 9.257 
Reasons given: none. Justification: none. The prisoners' convictions, their 
conscience, their beliefs - convictions for which their colleagues would, 
within months, fast to the death for - were summarily dismissed. 
However, several pages later, perhaps somewhat discomfited by their 
overhasty disregard of the prisoners' sense of their self identity, the 
Commissioners return to the question of political prisoner status; but with 
a vengeance. Although the issue was raised neither by the plaintiff prisoners 
nor the defendant British government, the Commissioners went out of their 
way to pontificate, again without further elaboration, that "the Commission 
does not consider that such an entitlement [political prisoner status] in the 
present context can be derived from the existing norms of International 
Law."258 I interpret this as the invocation of a masternarrative -
International Law, with a capital I and a capital L - to assert a will to 
253 Mcfeely, supra note 151 at 90. 
254 Id. at 91. 
255 Differend, supra note 70 at 8. 
256 Supra note 232. 
257 Mcfeely, supra note 151 at 77. 
258 Id. at 80. 
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power on the part of international bureaucrats.259 By invoking the 
foundationalist, reified and legitimizing discursive regime of International 
Law, the Commissioners could feign positivist formalism. By claiming that 
their hands were tied, they could justify a gratuitous mandarin antipathy to 
the marginalized, and categorically silence the claims of the colonized who 
have the upstart audacity to challenge their colonizers.260 
Le Differend has its critical-political goal the uncovering of differends where 
they have been repressed or supposedly resolved; it argues for the necessity 
of listening to the idiom not given its day in court, to the silence imposed on 
the victims of oppression and injustice. It attacks .all mechanisms of 
repression, all courts, institutions, systems of thought that perpetuate the 
injustice of universal judgment and thus do not recognize the silence imposed 
on their victims.261 
Within six months of this silencing, the prisoners resorted to their own, 
local, indigenous and embodied legal claim: the fast. 
V. THE POLITICAL AMBIVALENCES OF POSTMODERNISM262 
In Part III, I drew on the critical analytical insights of postmodernism and 
deconstruction to provide a re-interpretation of the juridical politics of the 
hunger strike. Specifically, I proposed that there was a valid legal 
foundation for the prisone'rs' claims that could be justified either by 
reference to ancient Irish Brehon law, or to contemporary legal theory in the 
259 This strategy is not unprecedented. In 1532 Franciscus de Victoria invoked the "Law of 
Nations" in defence of Spain's colonization of "the Americas." See supra note 7 at 97-
108. 
260 In fact there were several possible grounds upon which the prisoners could have chosen 
to argue their claims in international law. First, they could have relied on Common 
Article Three, Protocol I, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 ; 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 6 U.S.T. 
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;  6 U.S.T. 35 16, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. Second, they could have invoked Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977). Third, 
they might have looked to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976). While some 
commentators have expressed skepticism as to the potential success of such arguments 
"Boyle et al., Ten Years, supra note 149 at 94-95; J.M. Spillane, "Terrorists and Special 
Status: The British Experience in Northern Ireland" ( 1986) Hastings lnt'l. & Comp. L 
Rev. 481," my main point remains that no such arguments were ever made to the 
Commissioners. Therefore, for the Commissioners to pontificate ex cathedra without the 
benefit of argument from the parties and without giving reasons for their determination 
is arrogant, conceited and downright oppressive. 
26 1 D. Carroll, "Rephrasing the Political With Kant and Lyotard: From Aesthetic to Political 
Judgements" (1984) 14:3 Diacritics 74 at 78. 
262 It may be appropriate to forestall a possible objection at this point. Some might argue 
that this essay asks of deconstruction and postmodernism something t�at is 
fundamentally alien to their perpetually critical disposition - reconstructive possibilities 
- and therefore that they are being subjected to instrumental standards. In reply, this 
essay adopts an anthropomorphic stance and argues that in politics and law the 
benchmark is the diminution or exacerbation of domination and subordination. This point 
will be elaborated in Part IV, A. 
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form of "destabilization" or "solidarity" rights, or, Lyotardian injustice. 
However, further consideration suggests that postmodernism and 
deconstruction, if left unmodified, can cause some serious problems for, and 
may even compromise, those who believe in progressive political practice. 
To substantiate this essay's "attractive aversion"263 to postmodernism and 
deconstruction, these possible limitations will be discussed under the 
headings of: power, the text, practice and (in)justice; agency, power and 
(un)truth; language and power; and, identity politics. In the course of my 
arguments, I will attempt to rebut the potential postmodern accusation that 
I, too, am caught with my modernist hands in the till. 
A. Power, the Text, Practice and (ln)Justice 
Postmodernism and deconstruction have implemented a dramatic 
transformation in the analyses· and discourses of social theory, literary 
criticism, philosophy, political theory and jurisprudence. Within modernist 
and humanist approaches the analytical paradigm was very much organized 
on the conceptual bases of "the author", "the individual", "intention", 
"will", "consciousness", "subjectivity", "choice", "freedom", "autonomy" 
and "rights." With the arrival of postmodernism, and its decomposition of 
the "subject", the analytical paradigm has shifted to become preoccupied 
with "language games", and in particular the ideas of "interpretation", 
"narrative", "translation", "dialogue", "inscription", "meaning", and "herme­
neutics." So, for example, Lyotard argues that in order to "understand-social 
relations" what is needed is "a theory of games which accepts agnostics as 
a founding principle", an '"atomization' of the social into flexible networks 
of language games."264 Or, in Derrida's [in]famous phrase, "There is nothing 
outside of the text."265 
In so far as this latter proposition is understood as a pithy encapsulation 
of the claim that the possibility of interpretation - indeed interpretations 
- is always present, that essentialist and non-negotiable stances are 
indefensible, then it is a salutary thesis. However, insofar as the discourse 
of the "text" tends to become hegemonic, even a neo-metanarrative,266 and 
not just a supplement to traditional modes of social, political and juridical 
263 This oxymoronic idea· is culled from Theodor Adorno, see M. Jay, Adorno (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1984) at 14. 
264 Condition, supra note I 9 at 16-17. 
265 Grammatology, supra note 19 at 158- 159. 
266 Tendencies in this direction are to be found, I would suggest, in Derrida 's self­
proclaimed "generalization [of the concept of text] almost without limit, in any case 
without present or perceptible limit...." Derrida, "But Beyond", supra note 25 at 167. 
Note also his faith in "a general law of differance". Derrida, Margins, supra note 99 at 
15. 
To be clear, my suggestion is not that Derrida is a textual reductionist; rather it is that 
he over-emphasizes the possibilities of interpretation. Thus my critique avoids his 
accusation that: 
Every week I receive critical commentaries and studies on deconstruction which 
operate on the assumption that what they call 'post-structuralism' amounts to saying 
that there is nothing beyond language, that we are submerged in words - and other 
stupidities of that sort. 
Derrida, supra note 51 at 123. 
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analysis, we encounter the problematic issue of the relationship between 
texts and practices, or, more specifically, the relationship between structure 
and agency. To concretize these quite abstract suggestions, I will focus my 
discussion on Lyotard's and Derrida's respective conceptions of "justice" 
and inquire as to what contribution they might make to understanding the 
plight of the hunger strikers. 
I will discuss Lyotard first because his work provides us with an 
opportunity to consider one of postmodemism' s suggestions for 
reconstructive reconsideration: the proposition that "justice as a value is 
neither outmoded or suspect", that what is required is an "idea and practice 
of justice that is not linked to that of consensus."267 
As we have seen, to achieve a refurbishing of "justice" Lyotard advocates 
"justice as paralogy"268 and "the multiplication of small narratives."269 His 
conception of justice embraces the conflictual pluralism of language games 
in which "to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall 
within the domain of a general agnostics."210 Or, as he continues, "this does 
not necessarily mean that one plays to win."271 
In the abstract, this conception of justice as "just gaming", as dissensus, 
as the perennial play of incommensurability, sounds vaguely attractive. Its 
pluralism and heterogeneity would appear to foster the flourishing of 
difference and tolerance. However, when we think of justice in its concrete 
and socially embodied form - that is, as law - what are the practical 
consequences for a reconstruction of law? It is at this point that Lyotard's  
use of "language games" or "narratives" as metaphors or analogies for the 
forms of social interaction becomes shaky. Law is different 
Although Lyotard makes much of the claim that each micro-discourse has 
its own internal system of rules and norms, 272 he very rarely analyses in 
detail the spheres of social interaction to which these micro-narratives might 
pertain, or more importantly, what the particular rules of a specific micro­
narrative might be. This omission is crucial for understanding the difference 
of law because the very purpose of the rule of law is, literally, to rule, that 
is, to determine the legitimacy of competing narratives, to valorize some 
and to exclude others. In this light, it is important to revisit the way in 
which Lyotard introduces the concept of "the differend": 
[A] s distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of conflict, 
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of 
a rul e of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does 
not imply the other's lack of legitimacy.273 
But within the current politico-historical conjuncture, it falls to law to 
267 Lyotard, Condition, supra note 19 at 66 (emphasis in original). 
268 Id. at 60. 
269 Gaming, supra note 70. 
270 Id. at I 0. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 96. 
273 Dijferend, supra note 70 at xi. 
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provide "a rule of judgement", to be the final arbiter of disputes, to 
determine in an authoritative and authoritarian way when the play of 
narratives should cease. The rule of law, as the final source of legitimacy, 
is the classic mastemarrative, even more so perhaps than science which was 
Lyotard' s  favoured example. 
Now it may be that there is something of the prescriptive at work here, that 
Lyotard is proposing that law, like every other narrative, should curtail its 
hubris and thereby abdicate its determinative role. Again, at first blush, this 
might seem pluralistically attractive, but further consideration gives rise to 
concern. To posit that law should respond to, and respect the plurality of, nar­
ratives assumes that different narratives have an equal opportunity to 
articulate themselves, and to be understood. But surely this is a formal 
conception of equality that ignores the inequalities of differently situated 
"language games." The "narrative" of fasting based on the Brehon legal 
tradition is simply "untranslatable" and unintelligible within a discursive 
regime that has been colonized by a common law juridical psyche. To call on 
law to surrender its hegemonic position is like asking a monopoly to volunt­
arily surrender the marketplace pre-eminence that is its very raiso'! d 'etre. 
Thus, it seems that somewhere along the way power - or at least a 
certain type of power, the old-fashioned, relatively unsophisticated, 
instrumentalist form of power as coercion, duress and violence - has been 
factored out of the Lyotardian formula. How else is one to explain his 
curious equation of fighting with game playing,274 rather than domination, 
force and death. Law is a language game like no other: winning is all 
important when the stakes are life or death. 
To avoid this problem Lyotard attempts to delimit the scope of his thesis 
of "language games." However, it is a limitation that, as I shall point out, 
is unjustified within even his own terms of reference: 
I am excluding the case in which force operates by means of terror. This lies 
outside the realm of language games, because the efficacy of such a force is 
based entirely on the threat to eliminate the opposing player, not on making 
a better "move" than he [sic). Whenever efficiency . . .  is derived from a "Say 
or do this, or else you' ll never speak again," then we are in the real m of 
terror, and the social bond is destroyed.275 
Exactly. Law, in the current politico-historical conjuncture, is about the 
efficiency of dispute resolution when the social bond is destroyed. Law is 
a medium for the imposition of order when the incommensurability of social 
practices can no longer be controlled by other means. Law is but the 
constitutionalization of violence.276 The more problematic question, 
274 Condition, supra note I 9 at I 0. 
275 Id. at 46. 
276 See Devlin, Law's Centaur, supra note 8. See also as Poulantzas points out: 
State monopolized physical violence permanently underlies the techniques of power 
and mechanisms of consent, it is inscribed in the web of disciplinary and ideological 
devices; and even when it is not directly exercised, it shapes the materiality of the 
body upon which domination is brought to bear. 
N. Poulantzas, State, Power and Socialism (London: NLB, I 978) at 8.  
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however, is: on what basis does Lyotard ground his claim that terror can­
not be just another language game, or one of the rules of a particular 
narrative? Surely, this exclusivist stipulation is begging the question, 
packing the rules, so that Lyotard's conclusions are prefigured by his 
definition. Thus, it seems to me that a discussion of justice that promises to 
talk about "the practice of justice"277 but then fails to address the nature and 
role of law is of little assistance to those who are the victims of law 
because, overcome by juridical vertigo, it unpersuasively defines the 
problem out of existence. 
This ambivalence in Lyotard's position manifests itself in more concrete 
forms elsewhere in his work, and has (potential) lessons for those who 
might look to (his version of) postmodemism in support of their progressive 
practice. In Just Gaming, Lyotard indicates that both the Vietnamese and 
Algerians had "the right to rebel"278 because the forces of occupation denied 
them entitlement to their own narratives. It would seem, then, that his 
theory of justice countenances a right of rebellion against terror. But surely 
rebellion, as war - and we are all somewhat familiar with the brutality of 
the Vietnamese and Algerian wars - seeks to eliminate the "other", to have 
as its primary concern that which Lyotard excludes from his theory of 
language games: the aspiration to win.279 Given that "terror" is integral to 
war and rebellion, what is the basis of the Lyotardian "right" to rebellion for 
an indigenous narrative? 
Moreover, in his later book, The Differend, Lyotard appears to retreat 
from his thoughts on a right of rebellion when he asserts that, "proud 
struggles for independence end in young reactionary states."280 This is a very 
large empirical and normative claim, for which he provides no argument. 
But even if it is true, the question remains: What are the colonized to do? 
Talking it out - or agreeing to disagree - might be an attractive strategy 
for the philosopher, but it is a feckless strategy for decolonization.281 
Viewed in this light, Lyotard's conceptions of justice and injustice may 
be useful insofar as they help to reinforce the critique of authoritative 
power, and of the legitimizations that are offered for such power. However, 
277 Condition, supra note 19 at 66. 
278 Gaming, supra note 70 at 70. 
279 Id. at 10. 
280 Differend, supra note 70 at 181. For further indications of his ambivalences in relation 
to Algeria, see Lyotard, Peregrinations, supra note 60 at 26-27. 
281 A similar concern seems to underlie Derrida's thinking when he argues that: 
[N]ot only is there no kingdom of differance, but differance instigates the subversion 
of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening [to] and infallibly dreaded 
by everything within us that desires a kingdom. 
Margins, supra note 99 at 22. It seems to me that both Lyotard and Derrida have a 
legitimate concern: the perennial danger that the oppressed will, in turn, become an 
oppressor. While I would not want to argue that two wrongs make a right, politics is 
always a dangerous affair, and the colonized are, unfortunately, tainted by the power of 
the oppressor and therefore rarely innocent. (For example, during the course of the 
prisoners' protests, several prison officers were killed by the I.R.A.). But to leave 
colonization in its place because there are no guarantees hardly seems to be progressive 
or "revolutionary". And besides, historically, it is difficult to find a colonizer who has 
voluntarily surrendered its power. 
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they do not enable Lyotard to empower the dispossessed with a normative 
discourse or practice to advance their vision. 
Derrida, in my opinion, fares somewhat, but not enormously, better. 
While it would be both a mistake, I think, and unfair, I am sure, to read 
Derrida as arguing that there are no extra interpretive practices,282 his work 
in the main (and in spite of himself) remains hostage to the metaphor of the 
textuality of social relations and, as a consequence, is both enigmatic and 
distant from pressing practical engagements. 
In a recently published essay - Force of Law: The "Mystical 
Foundations of Authority"283 - Derrida directly addresses the questions of 
law and justice. Derrida divides his analysis into three sections. The first is 
a discussion of the interaction between justice, violence, law and 
deconstruction. The second performs a deconstructive reading of an essay 
by Walter Benjamin284 by means of which Derrida further interrogates the 
relationship between law and violence. The third section, a postscript, 
considers the relationship between Benjamin's essay and Nazism. 
There is much in Derrida's essay that is commendable in its 
"problematization of the foundations of law; morality and politics. "285 
Central to Derrida's argument is the disassociation of "law" and "justice" 
on the basis that the former is deconstructible whereas the latter is not: 
I .  The deconstructibility of law . .. , of legality, legitimacy or l egitimation 
makes deconstruction possible. 
2. The undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible, indeed 
is inseparable from it. 
3 .  The result: deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the 
undeconstructibility of j ustice from the deconstructibility of droit . . . .  286 
Or, as he states more pithily, "deconstruction is justice."287 The justification 
for this proposition is to be found in Derrida's vision of justice which he 
variously conceptualizes as "an aporia", "the incalculable", "the unde­
cidable", "an experience of the impossible", "infinite" and "heterogeneous 
and heterotropic."288 In short, for Derrida, justice is an always already 
deferred, an ungraspable yearning, a "yet-to-come (avenir)."289 
The advantage of this sundering of the conventional identification of law 
with justice is that it enables him to advance the proposition that "law [is 
282 Derrida has claimed that deconstruction is a "practico-political" stance, J. Derrida, The 
Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. A. Bass, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1 987) at 508 and he has explicitly recognized that there is "a field of 
non-discursive forces". Margins, supra note 99 at 329. See also Norris, Derrida, supra 
note 100 at 122, 142. 
283 Force, supra note 10. 
284 W. Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" in P. Dementz, ed., Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms 
and Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986) at 277. 
285 "Force", supra note 10 at 931. 
286 Id. at 945. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 947, 959, 963. 
289 Id. at 993. 
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a] violence without ground",290 or, as one commentator has more graphically 
suggested, "law is a masquerade of violence."291 At times, and seemingly at 
odds with Lyotard, he even appears (obliquely) to believe in a right to 
revolution.292 Moreover, and as against those who charge deconstruction 
with nihilism, throughout the essay Derrida is at pains to emphasize the 
connection between deconstruction and "intervention", "transformation" and 
"emancipation. "293 He even suggests that deconstruction can engender a 
"sense of responsibility without limits."294 
However, despite the fact that Derrida's essay serves reasonably well as 
a "critique of juridical ideology, a desedimentation of the superstructures of 
law",295 it seems to me that the self-confessed "guardedness"296 of his 
approach renders him incapable of justifying any of these responsible, 
interventionist, transformative and emancipatory activities. Even more 
importantly, I fear that aspects of his argument preclude the oppressed.from 
adopting a discourse by which they can justify their resistance, their 
revolutionary behaviour. 
As a logical consequence of his always and already deferred conception 
of justice (his thesis that justice is a future possibility always presently 
impossible) Derrida argues that "one cannot speak directly about 
justice ... say 'this is just' and even less 'I am just', without immediately 
betraying justice."297 Now, in one sense, given the forum and the audience298 
(as well as the principle of charity in interpretation), what Derrida is arguing 
has merit in that it appears to be an attempt to curtail the self-righteous 
conceit and arrogance of the already powerful. But (perhaps unintentionally) 
excluded from his analysis when he advances such a claim is "an/other" 
constituency: the disempowered. So what are the victims of oppression to 
do if they cannot directly appeal to justice? Can they provide any 
justification for their anti-colonial struggles that would not be subject to the 
tu quoque argument? Thus, ironically, it seems that the powerful come out 
ahead even when they are the subject of Derridean critique because their 
hegemony enables them to structurally determine the terrain of his 
discourse. In his haste to thwart the powerful, Derrida, with an excessive 
stroke of his deconstructive pen, may further disempower the already 
oppresssed. 
Furthermore, there is a curious - or perhaps more accurately, disturbing 
- process at work in Derrida's thesis that deconstruction is justice. It seems 
to me that in order to retain the integrity of his favoured (non)concept, 
"deconstruction", Derrida makes it a cognate of "justice." "Justice" - like 
290 Id. at 943. 
29 1 D. Cornell, "The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice" (1990) 11 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1047. 
292 "Force", supra note 10 at 993. 
293 Id. at 931, 933, 954. 
294 Id. at 953. 
295 Id. at 941. 
296 Id. at 929. 
297 Id. at 935, 963. 
298 J. Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority"' . (Paper presented 
as keynote address, Benjamin Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University, New York). 
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deconstruction - is then said to be "undecon·structible." But in order to 
maintain this stance, "justice" is then blessed with an elusive and evasive 
--------------q-u-ality, reifiedalmost (transcendental even?), so that it cannot be 
"betrayed."299 The consequence is that "justice" is beatified; it is given a 
value superior to that of those who might need to invoke it: the . 
dispossessed. Such seems to be the logic of what might be called "the fear 
of besmirchment." 
To be fair to Derrida, he is aware of the problem of immediate political 
praxis and he counsels that an adoption of his conception of justice "cannot 
and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, 
within an institution or a state or bet.ween one institution or state and 
others."300 But how is one to know that s/he is doing the right thing in the 
absence of justice? How is one to determine if one's acts are interventionist, 
transformative and responsible? The only direction we receive from Derrida 
. that appears to go beyond this formalistic call to participate is his comment 
that "[n]othing seems to me less outdated than the classic emancipatory 
ideaI."301 But, in a sense, this only further complicates matters for even the 
most superficial familiarity with the history of political thought recognizes 
that "emancipation" is a profoundly indeterminate term, invoked, for 
example, by Marxists and conservatives, colonizers and the colonized. To 
replace the concept of "justice" with the essentially contested concept of 
"emancipation", without any substantiation of what the latter term might 
mean, seems to be an unfortunate shell game. 
These concerns are intensified when we review Derrida's deconstruction 
of Benjamin's Critique of Violence. The primary focus of Derrida's 
deconstruction is the distinction Benjamin draws between "founding" (law­
giving) and "conserving" (law-preserving) violence, the former which 
Benjamin appears to justify, the latter which he appears to condemn. 
Derrida's familiar point is that such a sharp distinction is indefensible in 
that each form of violence contaminates the other3°2 and, consequently, that 
it is impossible to categorically justify one but ·not the other. Derrida's 
argument seems to be that the quest for origins or foundations is but a 
manifestation of the bete noir of western thought: logocentrism, the 
metaphysics of presence. But surely, those who are involved in anticolonial 
struggles need to be able to point to an alternative origin, a competing 
discourse (in this case lrish self-determination) to justify their revolutionary 
practices. 303 
Derrida, however, seems to suggest that this is an illegitimate position to 
adopt because if such movements are truly revolutionary then their 
299 "Force", supra note 10 at 935. 
300 Id. at 971. 
301 Id. at 97 I.  
302 Id. at 997, 1007. 
303 "Origins" in this sense is not to be understood as essential or foundational in a 
philosophical sense. Origins, as used here, is a historic\zed concept, as pan of an 
oppositional discourse, as a dangerous politicizing supplement: "as a revolutionary 
chance in the fight for the oppressed past." W. Benjamin, Illuminations H. Arendt, ed., 
trans. H. Zohn (New York: Brace and World Inc., 1968) at 253-264. 
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discourse and violence depend upon the achievement of that which they 
aspire to, something that is not yet. Justification, Derrida argues, can only 
be ex post: 
A "successful" revolution, the "successful foundation of a State (in somewhat 
the same sense that one speaks of a "felicitous" performative speech act) will 
produce apres coup what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, 
proper interpretive models to read in return, to give sense, necessity and 
above all legitimacy to the violence that has produced, among others, the 
interpretive model in question, that is, the discourse of self-legitimation. 
Examples of this circle, this other hermeneutic circle, are not lacking ... 
whether it's a question of what happens from one neighbourhood to another, 
one street to another in  a great metropolis or from one country or one camp 
to another around a world war in the course of which States and nations are 
founded, destroyed or redesigned. There are cases in which it is not known 
for generations if the performative of the violent founding of a state is 
"felicitous" or not. 304 
I think that this is where Derrida's reliance on hermeneutic metaphors 
encounters profound problems. Revolutionary practice is worlds away_ from 
"performative speech acts." Revolutionaries, in order to have any chance of 
success, require an immediate - even if contaminated - discourse to 
mobilize support for their emancipatory practice. Revolutionaries have to 
know, and they have to be able to convince their potential supporters, that 
they are justified in their actions. People who go on hunger strike may 
require the discourse of justice not only to galvanize solidarity with their 
communities, but also to reflect upon the appropriateness of their own 
decisions. They need to be able to directly argue that their acts are "just." 
The oppressed need justice in a multitude of ways.305 Derrida's elusive 
theory of justice denies them that resource. 
The foregoing references to "solidarity" lead to a final potential problem 
with Derrida's essay. At several points, Derrida argues that the concern of 
justice is with "singularity" and "individuals"306 which, in my opinion, is 
problematic for two reasons. First, it fits very uncomfortably with Derrida's 
propositions elsewhere that seem to underplay the concept of "the subject." 
This is a point I shall return to in the next section. Second, the valorization 
of singularity tends to exclude group-based concerns (for example, 
nationalism) and therefore potentially devalues solidarity.307 This will be 
discussed further in Part V, D. 
In sum, as a method of understanding, explanation and politicization, I 
304 "Force", supra note 10 at 993. 
305 See also V. Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless", J. Keane, ed., The Power of the 
Powerless (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1985). 
306 "Force", supra note 10 at 949, 955. 
307 In one of these references to singularity, Derrida does in fact mention "groups", but 
qualifies it with the modifier "irreplaceable", without elaborating on the significance of 
such a term, id. at 949. It does suggest that groupism or groupist-based claims in and 
of itself or themselves is/are not a concern of justice. 
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would argue that while the characterization of socio-legal relations in 
literary terms may have its strengths, it also has its weaknesses. Having put 
"the Word in its place",308 both Derrida and Lyotard seem to have become 
trapped in the metaphor of the text, allowing it to take on a dynamic of its 
own, conceding to it a potentially canonical status, thereby infusing their 
analyses "with the ethico-political ambiguity" of which Derrida accuses 
Benjamin.309 In other words, while discourse is a manifestation of power, it 
is not the only manifestation of power, and indeed is, in many ways, 
circumscribed and constituted by instrumental and institutional power. 
Accordingly, while supplements may be dangerous to the dominant 
discourse, they may be even rnore dangerous for those who articulate them; 
for, the price of speaking as "the other" may be the destruction of the 
speaker. The differential play of "endless ... reversals and counter-rever­
sals"3'0 comes to an abrupt halt when one of the reversals becomes too 
dangerous. In short, death makes a difference. 
B. Agency, Power and (Un)Truth 
There is, of course, an obvious postmodern response to the critique I have 
advanced: that my argument privileges consciousness and therefore smacks 
of a revivalist and revolutionary voluntarism that is dependent upon an 
idealistic and nostalgic humanism. Nationalism, after all, is but a by-product 
of modernity and modernist thinking3" and its embracement can lead to a 
crude nativism.312 More specifically, the postmodernist counterargument 
might suggest that the fasting prisoners were but the "effect",313 "site",314 
determination or symptom of the various discourses and structures of Irish 
Republicanism: "slave(s) of language."315 They were inscriptions of a 
deviationist subtext, not authors of their destiny. De Man would call my 
reversal of cause and effect metalepsis. 3 16 
.Derrida may be particularly skeptical of the sort of argument which I am 
attempting to advance given that he has been quite explicit in his 
displacement of "the subject." For example, at one point, he argues that "the 
subject" is but "the play of linguistic or semiological differance"317 and, at 
308 D. Hebdige, Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things (New York: Routledge, 1988) 
at 226. 
309 "Force", supra note 10 at 1025. 
310 "Deconstructive Practice", supra note 24 at 764. 
311 See e.g., J. Lyotard, "Rudiments Pai ens" (1977) at 145 quoted in Bennington, supra note 
251 at 52-53. 
312 T. Niranjana, Siting Translation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) 166-
169. 
3 I 3 Derrida, for example, posits that consciousness is "a determination" or an "effect", 
Margins, supra note 99 at 16. For a similar construction of the subject see Positions, 
supra note 94 at 122 and Speech, supra note 99 at 147. Foucault argues that "the man 
described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already himself the effect of a 
subjection much more profound than himself." M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 977) at 30. 
3 14 Ferry & Renaud, supra note 243 at 209; Schlag, "Le Hors", supra note 24 at I 671. 
315 J. Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) at 148. 
316 P. De Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Russeau, Nietzsche, Rilke and 
Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) at 274. 
317 Speech, supra note 99 at 146. 
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another, he posits that "the authority of representation constrains us, 
imposing itself on our thought through a whole dense, enigmatic and 
heavily stratified history. It programs us and precedes us."3 18  More 
expansively: 
[T]he subj ect (in its identity with itself, or eventually in its consciousness of its 
identity with itself, its self consciousness) is inscribed in language, is a ' function' 
of language, becomes a speaking subject only by maki ng its speech conform -
even in so-called ' creation', or in so called ' transgression' - to the system of the 
rules of language as a system of differences, or at the very least by· conforming 
to the general law of differance.319 
And, with admirable antilogocentric consistency, Derrida confesses his own 
lack of agency by denying that he chooses interpretations, rather "the 
interpretations select themselves."320 
In relation to something like the hunger strike, this espousal of structural 
determinism, this deconstructive effacement of the distinction between 
subject and object, is an attractive thesis in that it seems to explain that 
which is apparently so eccentric as to be inexplainable: the self-sacrifice of 
the self in full knowledge of the likelihood of death. However, the problems 
with an adoption of this postmodern approach to the question of the subject 
are twofold. First, it is insufficiently oppositional in its politico-juridical 
orientation because it fails to analyse the ways in which even the oppressed 
can find room to manoeuvre, and therefore resist. Second, by trivializing 
oppositional agency it potentially reinforces continued oppression. I will 
elaborate on both of these arguments in tum. 
1. Explaining Room to Maneuver 
My first concern about an excessively passive theory of the subject 
suggests that, in its best light, postmodemism provides little account of how 
the oppressed actually determine their condition, make choices and resist 
domination.321 In its worst light, it considers the oppressed to be dupes or 
3 18 J. Derrida, "Sendin: On Representation" ( 1982) 49 Social Research 294 at 304. 
And Baudrillard harmonizes: 
Far from the individual expressing his needs in the economic system, it is the 
economic systeni that induces the individual function and the parallel functionality of 
objects and needs. The individual is an ideological structure, a historical form 
correlative with the commodity form (exchange value) and the object form (use 
value). The individual is nothing but the subject thought in economic terms, 
rethought, simplified and abstracted by the economy. The entire history of 
consciousness and ethics (all the categories of occidental psychometaphysics) is only 
the history of the political economy o f  the subject. 
J. Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (St. Louis, Mo.: Telos 
Press, 198 1) at 1 33. 
319 Margins, supra note 99 at 15. See also Positions, supra note 94 at 28-29. 
320 J. Derrida, "Interview" ( 1980) 14 Literary Rev. 2 1. 
321 For further discussions of resistance see e.g., B. Moore Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases 
of Obedience and Revolt (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Scott, supra note 127; P. 
Ewick & S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness" ( 1992) 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 73 1 ;  A. Sarai, " 'The Law is All Over' : 
Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor" ( 1990) 2 Yale J. 
Law & Hum. at 343. 
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automatons. The sort of propositions advanced by Derrida run the risk of 
oversimplifying the relationship between agency and structure, of merely 
inverting the humanist hierarchy of agency over structure and, therefore, 
simply mimicking it.322 But perhaps this goes too far and what is required 
is mediation between structure and agency, so that Liberal humanism's 
ontological fetishization of the sovereign subject is not replaced by an 
excessive and reactive anti-humanism,323 thereby causing postmodernism to 
slip into an anti-theory of self-hood and agency. 
There is a difference between a "sovereignself', a "situated self' and a 
"saturated self." The sovereign vision of the self endorses an a priori 
conception of subjecthood, where a person is assumed to be solitary, 
unified, rational and voluntaristic: "man [sic] as the·master and possessor 
of the totality of his actions and ideas."324 Such an ontology dovetails with 
a liberal humanist philosophy. The saturated conception of the self endorses 
a concatenated vision of subject, where the person is assumed to be a 
forcefield of structural determinants and discursive practices.325 Such a 
postmodernist ontology calls into question the possibility of self-reflective, 
self-constitution. The situated vision of the self advocates an embedded 
conception of the subject which allows for the possibility of consciousness 
and self-constiiution in the context of the matrix of societal and cultural 
influences. This vision of the subject - which might also be called a 
"protean_ subject" - acknowledges the significance of structural factors in 
the "development" of the subject, but still maintains a sense of the subject 
as a potential, "the infinite within the finite."326 Such a reconstructed 
conception of the subject has no necessary substantive characteristics (and 
in that sense it can be said to be ontologically thin) and is responsive to 
formative discourses (and in that sense it can be understood as non­
individualistic and relational) but can still be understood as potentially 
agentic. 327 
In other words, what is required is a relational and historicized theory of 
the subject and a relational and historicized conception of agency. Such an 
ontology envisions the subject as neither the centre of the universe, nor a 
mere pastiche of social forces, but a subject who is both constituted and 
cons ti tu ti ve. 328 
322 It also suggests a return to a dualistic either/or which is normally anathema to 
deconstructive thought. 
323 Ferry & Renaut, supra note 243. 
324 Id. at xvi. 
325 For example, Baudrillard argues that so pervasive is the power of the object, all our 
options are precoded or predetermined, Simulations, supra note 42 at 111-1 17. 
326 R.M. Unger, Passion: An Essay on Human Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984). 
327 But see contra, "Le Hors", supra note 24 at 1668-1674 for a critique of what Schlag 
calls "the relatively autonomous self'. 
328 Seyla Benhabib posits that, "vis a vis our own stories we are in the position of author 
and character at once", "Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance" ( I  991) 11 
Praxis International I 37 at 140. 
For the sake of completeness it should be pointed out that, on occasion, Derrida hints 
at such a situated conception of the subject. See-e.g., his proposition that "(t)he subject 
is absolutely indispensable. I don't destroy the subject, I situate it", E. Donato & R.  
Macksey, eds., The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Critism and the 
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These abstract propositions may have some concrete purchase. There is 
little doubt that Republicanism as a discourse is an important factor in Irish 
life, but it is not so determinative or constraining as postmodernists might 
have us believe. Republicanism in the late 1970s and early 1980s underwent 
a significant transition from its traditional politically abstentionist and 
exclusively militaristic form, to a politically participatory and more social 
movement. Postmodern methodology might enable us to track this transition 
by encouraging us to look at the microdetails of this development. In 
particular, we would have to analyse the changing subjectivities and 
emerging ideologies of actors such as Gerry Adams329 and Bobby Sands330 
- Irish, Belfast-reared, male, working class, (a)religious - and the 
differences of opinion within the Army Council of the IRA. Most 
particularly, we can learn from "the comms" that were smuggled out of the 
H-Blocks prior to, and during, the fast. These are perhaps the classic 
postmodern deviationist microtexts in that as much as 4,000 words331 could 
be written with a biro refill tube on one cigarette paper or "stamped 
government property toilet roll."332 These "hidden transcripts"333 would then 
be smuggled to the outside world through bodily orifices - themselves 
penetratingly surveilled334 - thereby enabling the prisoners to implement 
a change of direction and determine a future agenda for Republicanism.335 
By means of these "comms" the prisoners disseminated an alternative 
political vision for the IRA and even outlined the most appropriate 
strategies of mobilization, froin massive postering campaigns to the 
nomination of fasting prisoners as election candidates. 336 
Sciences of Han (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) at 271. The problem, as I have 
noted in the text, is that the preponderance of his analyses - many of which were 
written after this comment - cut in the other direction. 
329 In recent years, Adams has become increasingly explicit about the socialist orientation 
of Sinn Fein. "We believe that a system of socialism in Ireland should be tailored to 
meet Irish needs", interview with Magill, March 1989, Dublin. See also, Keena, supra 
note 126. 
330 Feldman, supra note 138 at 162-163, 213 makes some efforts in this direction. 
331 Id. at 199. 
332 Sands, 'Things Remain the Same - Torturous", Skylark, supra note 1 at 131. 
333 Scott, supra note 127 at xii, 25. 
334 So creative were the prisoners that they also smuggled in tobacco, biro pen refills, flints, 
quartz crystal radios, cameras and even a gun (suitably broken down) via their orifices. 
The parts of their bodies adapted to these practices of resistance included their ears, 
nose, mouth, navels, foreskins, pubic hair and, most commonly, anus. See Bishop & 
Mallie, supra note 123 at 276 and Beresford, supra note 3 at 63. 
335 Feldman, supra note 138 at 161-163, 219-222. 
336 See for example, the "comm" reproduced in Clarke, supra note 154, Appendix I at 242. 
Another point may also be worth noting. Like many revolutionary organizations, 
traditionally, the IRA has been highly centralized and undemocratic in• its structure. 
"Volunteers", as passified subjects, take orders; they do not set policy. So, too, do 
prisoners. But the imprisonment period of the 1970' s engendered a transformation of the 
form of the organization and the prisoners became more agentic. Through their 
conversations, debates and reflections on "the struggle", the prisoners rejected the idea 
that the vanguard elite of the Army Council of the IRA in its converitional militaristic 
wisdom knew best. Consequently, the IRA became more open, democratic and 
participatory, enabling the prisoners to envision new strategies, creating in embryonic 
form an innovative political structure. This would eventually filter out and up to the 
leadership and eventually .re-orient the political strategy and reconfigure the political 
processes of the republican movement. 
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As the late 1970s wore on, it became increasingly apparent to the 
prisoners that, despite some outside support, their various protests were not 
going to change the British state's determination to impose criminalization, 
nor generate further support for "political status" in the nationalist 
community. The terrain of struggle was significantly enlarged when the 
prisoners, against the advice of the Army Council, decided that by means 
of a hunger strike there could be a galvanization of the nationalist 
community around republicanism. In other words, it was determined by the 
prisoners that the traditionally sanctified unidimensional military campaign 
could not succeed. Although the first couple of weeks of the fast expanded 
the support network, the majority of the nationalist community remained 
leery. The key breakthrough occurred when it was decided ( once again by 
the fasting prisoners)337 that the traditional republican position of 
abstentionism from political campaigns should be abandoned and it was 
proposed to run Bobby Sands as the candidate for the British Parliament in 
the constituency of Fermanagh-South Tyrone. This strategy forced the issue 
within the nationalist community as to whether it would split the vote 
between the republican, Sands, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) candidate,338 and thereby let the single Unionist candidate win. The 
SDLP backed down, giving the full nationalist stage to Sands. The result 
was that on April 9th, 1981 ,  a self confessed IRA volunteer was elected to 
the British Parliament with 30,492 votes. There was a boomerang effect. 
Criminalization as a strategy of delegitimization was in shambles, and the 
British could no longer credibly claim that the IRA had no local support.339 
Furthermore, the election of two more of the fasting prisoners in a 
general election in the Republic of Ireland a few months later was crucial 
to the defeat of the governing party, Fianna Fail.340 Moreover, with Sands' 
election to Parliament, international attention was focused not only on the 
strike, but on the whole issue of Britain: s occupation of Northern Ireland. 341 
Finally, the strike and the events around it_ indicated that the traditional 
Republican stance of political abstentionism in deference to militarism was 
337 Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 291. 
338 The S.D.L.P. is the preferred party of liberal nationalists. It advocates a constitutional 
route to a re-unification of Ireland. 
339 British interpretations have always attempted to portray the IRA as marginal to the 
nationalist community of Northern Ireland, devoid of popular support. See e.g., P. Jay, 
Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, (November 1978), describing the IRA as a "small 
group of armed terrorists", quoted in Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at 171. Or again, 
even after Sands' election to the British Parl iament, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Carrington, continued to protest, "Do not tell me the IRA represents people in Northern 
Ireland . ... They have no status, they are not accepted by anyone", quoted in Beresford, 
supra note 3 at 97. At the same time, however, the Foreign Office, through an agent 
called Mountain Climber, was clandestinely negotiat ing with the leadership of the IRA 
to see if a resolut ion to the hunger strike could be achieved. Id. at 3-5, 225-230, 249-
254. 
340 Kelley, supra note 165 at 341; Coogan, IRA, supra note 159 at 631. 
341 Curtis, supra note 167. For a more detailed account of international support and media 
coverage, see Feehan, supra note 166 at 20-23, 139. It might also be worth noting that 
during the hunger strike, financial support for the IRA from the United States is 
estimated to have increased from approximately $160,000 per year to $888,000. Bishop 
& Mallie, supra note 123 at 235. 
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misconceived. The fast served as a catalyst for Sinn Fein to participate in 
subsequent local, general and European elections where it obtained between 
10.2% and 13.4% of the overall vote, or between 25% to 40% of the 
Nationalist vote in Northern Ireland.342 Small wonder then that the British 
foreign office, when briefing young diplomats on Irish history, considers the 
hunger strike to be "an unmitigated disaster."343 The prisoners negated the 
negation.344 Resistance though marginal, suitably engendered, can erupt in 
pheno_menal ways. 345 
This apprehension about the progressive political utility of deconstruction 
and postmodernism is intensified when one reviews some of the more 
explicitly "political work" of Derrida and Baudrillard: the former is 
disturbingly equivocal as to the political ramifications of his own project 
and the latter endorses a dangerous political quietism. Because of their 
passive conception of the subject, neither theorist seems to be sufficiently 
attuned to what I would describe as the noisy agency of the subjugated, but 
not totally erased, subject. 
It might be contended that it is unfair to complain about Derrida's 
political progressivism, given that in 1983 he wrote a short essay which 
challenged not only apartheid but also the West's complicity in its 
perpetuation.346 Moreover, apparently in reply to those who have voiced 
concerns about the political insignificance of deconstruction, he has argued 
(with uncharacteristic clarity) that: 
[W]hat is somewhat hastily called deconstruction is not, if it is of any 
consequence, a specialized set of discursive procedures , even less the rules 
of a new hermeneutic method, working on texts or utterances in the shelter 
of a given and stable institution. It is also, at the very least, a way of taking 
a position, in its work o f  analysis, concerning the political and institutional 
structures that make possible and govern our practice, our competencies, our 
performances. Precisely because it is never concerned only with signified 
342 For discussions of Sinn Fein's subsequent electoral forays see Clarke, supra note 154 
at 211-219; Coogan, IRA, supra note 159 at 632-633; Keena, supra note 126 at 106, 
109, 120, 127, 132-134. 
343 Beresford, supra note 3 at 331. 
344 This account of the mobilization of nationalists also challenges Baudrillard's assertion 
that, "indifference of the masses is their true, their only practice ... the brute fact ... of 
a refusal to participate in the recommended ideas, however enlightened". Or again, his 
proposition that "at no time are the masses politically or historically engaged in a 
conscious manner. They have only ever done so out of perversity, in complete 
irresponsibility", Shadow, supra note 42 at 14, 38. 
345 The costs are, of course, potentially very high. Not only did ten prisoners die, four of 
the organizers of the National H Block/Armagh Committee were assassinated and three 
others were seriously wounded. Nine prison officers were killed by the IRA in the latter 
half of the 1970's. 
346 J. Derrida, "Racism's Last Word" (1985) 12 Critical Inquiry 290. This essay generated 
a critical response from A. McLintock & R. Nixon, "No Names Apart: The Separation 
of Word and History in Derrida's 'Le Dernier Mot du Racism"' (1986) 13 Critical 
Inquiry 140. In turn, this received a very harsh - even vicious - response from 
Derrida: "But, Beyond ... " (1986) 13 Critical Inquiry 155 [hereinafter "But Beyond"]. 
This last essay is particularly confusing in that Derrida invokes and relies upon concepts 
such as "truth", "countertruth", "reality", and even a most curious "most evident 
meaning", id. at 166, 156, 160. 
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content, deconstruction should not be separable from this politico- institutional 
problematic and should seek a new investigation of responsibility, an 
investigation which questions the codes inherited from ethics and politics. 
This means that too political for some, it will seem paralyzing to these who 
only recognize politics by the most familiar road signs.347 
While this seems to be an unequivocal articulation of the political 
ramifications of deconstruction, it is, in my opinion, vitiated in two ways. 
First, the comment lacks any specificity as to what might qualify as an 
acceptable "position" or appropriate "responsibility." The abstraction of the 
argument renders it indeterminate and therefore potentially as supportive of 
oppressive political practices as liberationist political practices. Second, on 
what basis are we to justify any "position" that we might "choose" - or is 
it that such positions might "choose" themselves348 - if deconstruction has 
as its primary purpose displacement and the proliferation of multiplicity? 
Indeed, despite these claims of deconstruction's political relevance, on 
other occasions Derrida has also expressed reservations: "I must confess 
that I have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to existing 
political programmes."349 But, he then proceeds to argue that this does not 
require inaction or non-commitment: 
But the difficulty is to gesture in opposite d irections at the same time: on the one 
hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official political 
codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical and 
engaged manner whenever the necessity arises. This position of dual allegiance, 
in which I personal ly find myself, is one of perpetual uneasiness. I try where I can 
to act politically while recognizing that such action remains incommensurate 
with my intellectual project of deconstruction. 350 
And to be fair, it must be acknowledged that Derrida the int�rventionist351 
has taken some progressive political positions. For example, in 1981 he 
visited Prague to meet with some dissident intellectuals. For his troubles he 
was arrested and jailed for three days. But what did Derrida the decon­
structionist philosopher make of his experience? As one commentator 
reports, Derrida: 
347 Quoted in R. Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) 186-187. 
See also Derrida, Positions, supra note 94, where he proclaims, "I have always insisted 
on the value practice", id. at 89. 
348 See infra V, B. 
349 Dialogue with Jacques Derrida in R. Kearney, ed., Dialogues with Contemporary 
Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984) at 119. 
350 Id. at 120. The last sentence of this quotation displays a couple of interesting and 
contestable assumptions. First, the posposition "I try where I can" seems to resurrect the 
voluntaristic sovereign subject. Second, Derrida also seems to assume that there is a 
sharp distinction between the political and the non-political, that his philosophy is 
apolitical. Much of contemporary progressive theory would reject such a distinction and 
endorse the maxim "that it is all politics". 
351 "Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes". Derrida, Positions, supra 
note 94 at 93 (emphasis in original). 
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insisted on the difficulty there is in making an ethico- political gesture (supporting 
the resistance of the Prague philosophers, who demand respect for human rights 
... and articulate that with a philosophy of the subject, the person, individual 
liberty etc.) coincide with a philosophical labour governed by the necessity of 
deconstructing precisely such philosophemes.352 
Viewed in this light, political prisoners in British occupied Northern 
Ireland could expect little in the way of support from "revolutionary" 
deconstruction, except perhaps a passing mention in a law review 
article. 353 
Nor is Derrida alone in his quietism, in the retreat from the discussion of 
praxis.354 Baudrillard, too, has suggested that given the pervasiveness of 
hyperreality and hyperconformity,355 "withdrawing into the private could 
well be a direct defiance of the political, a form of actively resisting 
political manipulation."356 For Baudrillard "indifference", inertia and non­
participation are the only available "counter-strategies":357 
This revolution by involution . . .  proceeds by  inertia and not from a new and 
joyous negativity. It is silent and involutive - exactly the reverse of all 
speechmaking and consciousness raising. It has no meaning, it has nothing 
to say to us.358 
Yet again, events in the H-Blocks problematize the validity and utility of 
such a celebration of the politics of silence. It was not that the prisoners had 
"nothing to say"; rather, it was that they had "no say."359 As pointed out 
352 T. Keenan, "Reading Foucault on a Bias" ( 1987) 15 Political Theory 5 at 19. 
353 "Force", supra note 10 at 997. 
354 Consider the following quotation from Lyotard on his thesis of "justice as paralogy": 
And the idea that I think we need today in order to make decisions in political matters 
cannot be the idea of totality, or of the unity, of the body. It can only be the idea of 
multiplicity or of a diversity. Then the question arises: How can a regulatory use of 
this idea of the political take place? How can it be pragmatically efficacious ... ? ls a 
politics regulated by such an idea of multiplicity possible? Is it possible to decide in 
a just way in, and according to, this multiplicity? And here I must say that I don't 
know. 
Lyotard, Gaming, supra note 70 at 94. 
355 Baudrilliard, Shadow, supra note 42 at 41. 
356 Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). 
357 Id. at 105. 
358 Id. at 49. And, with perfect consistency, he has made this apolitical project his personal 
stance, freely admitting his own political disaffection, disenchantment, marginality and 
irrelevance, J. Baudrillard, "Intellectuals, Commitment and Political Power" ( 1984-85) 
11 Thesis Eleven at 166. 
On occasion, Derrida also espouses the embracement of silence. For example, in his 
support of Art Against Apartheid, he concludes, perhaps a little melodrammatically: 
Beyond a continent whose limits they point to ... the paintings gaze and call out in 
silence. And their silence is just. A discourse would once again compel us to reckon 
with state force and law .... This silence calls out unconditionally; it keeps watch on 
that which is not yet, and on the chance of still remembering some faithful day. 
Derrida, But Beyond ... , supra note 346 at 299. 
359 M. Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues: Dialogics Dialectics, and the Black Woman 
Writer's Tradition", Theorize, supra note 52, 144 at 15 I. As a father of a fasting 
prisoner said, prior to his son's death, "My son is no dupe, he understands clearly what 
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previously, one reason the British government sought to enforce the cell 
system of incarceration was to undermine the collectivism and solidarity 
fostered in the dormitory-type cages of Long Kesh. The H-Blocks were 
originally designed to accommodate one prisoner per cell and prisoners, on 
entering, for the first year or so, were subjected to a rigorous regime of 
silence:360 communication with their colleagues was prohibited. Such a 
strategy of isolation and individualization was tailored to reinforce the 
project of criminalization. "Solitude", as Foucault reminds us, "is the 
primary condition of total submission."361 But rather than being "dumb like 
beasts",362 the prisoners resisted, both instrumentally and structurally. 
Instrumentally, they began to communicate with each other by tapping on 
the heating pipes, exchanging "comms" at the we:ekly mass (one of the few 
opportunities for interaction) and by gradually reviving the Irish language. 
Structurally, the nature of the "dirty protest" forced the prison authorities 
to periodically hose down the cells to prevent diseases. Consequently, one 
of the arms of the H had to be kept vacant in order to relocate the prisoners 
to that section while the other was being cleaned.363 This, in conjunction 
with the very high imprisonment rates generated by the Diplock court 
system,364 created an overpopulation problem for the prison administration 
which was "solved" by putting two prisoners in most cells. The result was 
to undermine the original plan for a regime of silence. It was this 
reconsolidation of collectivism that engendered the group solidarity 
necessary to sustain the "blanket", "no wash" and "dirty" protests and, 
eventually, to plan and pursue the. hunger strike. It was only during the fast 
itself that the silence re-emerged, for, as one ex-prisoner has put it: 
The slagging and practical joking stopped during the hunger strike. I minded 
Bobby [Sands] sayi ng the joking shouldn' t decrease. B ut i t  was dead a rtificial. 
There was no fucking singsongs. We tried but it wouldn' t work. Bobby had asked 
us not to get into the silence. We were all in mourning for the duration.365 
Moreover, and as a further example of how the prisoners refused to be 
passive, we can consider how they mobilized time against space.366 As 
previously pointed out, imprisonment generally, and the H-Blocks 
he is doing and the consequences of his action", quoted in Clarke, supra note 154 at 
184. 
360 Feldman, supra note 138 at 157. 
361 Foucault traces the importance of isolation to English penological thought as far back 
as 1775. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972) at 123-124, 237. 
362 Baudrillard, Shadow, supra note 42 at 315. 
363 Feldman, supra note 138 at 186. 
364 Supra note 150. 
365 Feldman, supra note 138 at 247. This is not to deny that there may be situations when 
silence may be the most appropriate and effective way of resisting, for example, during 
interrogation. See id. at 138. But to counsel, as Baudrillard seems to, the adoption of 
silence as an overall strategy would, I believe, be disastrous for progressive political 
practice. 
366 For a further discussion of the relationship between time, space and resistance, see Sarat, 
supra note 321 at 347-348. 
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specifically, attempted to construct the prisoners' space in such a way as to 
undermine their capacity for resistance and to cut them off from the outside 
world. In partial response, the prisoners turned to time, or more precisely a 
lack thereof, to undermine this process of atomization. By embarking upon 
a hunger strike the prisoners mapped out a period of time, between sixty and 
seventy days, in which they were able to breach the enclosure of space to 
focus the attention of the outside world on their cause. As against a 
bureaucratic colonial space, they opposed human time, or more accurately, its 
finitude. As de Certeau points out367 the powerful "privilege spatial relation­
ships ... [and] reduce temporal relations to spatial ones." Again, the prisoners 
inverted this hierarchy and asserted their power, if only temporarily, to 
indicate that even "total institutions"368 can be cracked open to P?litics. 
Thus, to summarize my first reservation about postmodemism's 
conception of the subject, I would suggest that it is so theoretically flimsy 
that it is incapable of bearing the explanatory weight that is imposed upon 
it. Therefore, it is proposed that a more robust theory would see agency and 
discourse as mutually constitutive. However, one can only understand the 
degree and extent of that mutuality by actually studying specific situations 
in particular politico-historical conjunctures.369 A general theory of 
personhood will only reveal partial answers. 
2. Complicity Through Trivialization 
The second problem with the postmodern process of the "aestheticization 
of politics"370 is that it potentially may be complicit in the continuation of 
oppression in so far as it trivializes both experiences of injustice and acts 
that seek to remedy such injustices. In particular, I am concerned that 
Baudrillard's espousal of "hyperreality" and "simulation" may accrue to the 
367 M. De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. S. Rendell (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984). 
368 E. Goffman, Asylum: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other 
Inmates (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., I 96 I). 
369 This historicized and situated conception of agency dovetails with Marx's famous 
statement that: 
[m]en [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they 
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.... 
Supra note 9 at 300. See also, the feminist postmodernist, Scott's, proposition : 
Treating the emergence of a new identity as a discursive event is not to introduce a 
new form of linguistic determinism, nor to deprive the subject of agency. It is to 
refuse a separation between "experience" and language and to insist instead on the 
productive quality of discourse. Subjects are constituted discursively, but there are 
conflicts among the discursive systems, contradictions within any one of them, 
multiple meanings for the concepts they deploy. And subjects have agency. They are 
not unified autonomous individuals exercising free will, but rather subjects whose 
agency is created through situations and statuses conferred upon them. Being a subject 
means being "subject to definite conditions of existence, conditions of the 
endowments of agents and conditions of existence." These conditions enable choices, 
although they are not unlimited. 
J. Scott, "Experience" in Theorize, supra note 52, 22 at 34. 
370 C. Norris, The Truth about Postmodernism (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 
1993) at 17 [hereinafter Postmodernism]. 
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benefit of those who wield dominant political power. 371 
By portraying the hunger strike as merely a particular manifestation of 
hyperreality, 372 by interpreting it as yet another manifestation of "ubiquitous 
simulacra, pseudo-events", 373 Baudrillard may trivialize the commitment and 
political consciousness of the subject hunger strikers. Death, through 
starvation for over sixty days, is more than simulation; it is more than game 
playing; it is more than a spectacle in the politics of illusion. Death, I would 
argue, is an authentic374 and absolute act of resistance in which agency 
draws on its final resource to transgress against a pseudo-hegemonic 
politico-juridical regime.375 In other words, postmodernism unmodified may 
suggest too much complicity and not enough critique, an inability to 
distinguish between domination and resistance. 376 It may be accurate to 
argue that we cannot know whether what the fasting prisoners sought was 
true in any transcendental sense, but that means neither that "truth ... [has] 
ceased to exist,"377 nor that we should consider subjects as paralysed by "the 
spell of indecision,"378 nor that we have "nowhere to go."379 
371 Hartsock articulates another criticism that straddles both of my concerns when she 
argues: 
Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at the precise moment when so many 
groups have been engaged in "nationalisms" which involve redefinition of the 
marginalized Others that suspicions emerge about the nature of the "subject", about 
the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about historical 
"progress". Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been 
silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than 
objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic? 
N. Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" in Fraser & Nicholson, supra 
note 65, 157 at I 63. 
372 Smyth is getting at the same idea when he comments, "it might even be possible, in the 
ultimate post-modern scenario, to tum West Belfast into a theme park featuring staged 
riots and gun battles", supra note I O  at 150. In fact, in my experience, this has already 
happened. In the North Belfast community where I grew up during the mid 1970's there 
were frequent accounts of how American journalists, not alone but in particular, would 
pay children £5 to throw petrol bombs at the British army patrols just to get a good 
"shot". In British occupied Northern Ireland, the throwing of a petrol bomb is considered 
to be causing utmost danger to the soldiers which entitles them to shoot back with 
plastic, rubber and lead bullets. 
373 Hassan, supra note 40 at xvi . 
374 For a discussion as to the ethical and political importance of salvaging the authenticity 
of anti-colonialist resistance from "the paralysing cynicism of post-structuralism", see 
Binder, Nazism, supra note 20 at 1364-1372. 
375 To be clear, my suggestion here is not a euphoric valorization of sacrifice and death, as 
Baudrillard occasionally verges on in both his "Symbolic Exchange and Death" in 
Writings, supra note 42 at 119-148, and his discussion of the Tasaday peoples of the 
Philippines in Simulations, supra note 42 at 13-17. 
376 For an interpretation of postmodemism as a manifestation of the paradox of "complicity 
and critique", see L. Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 
1989). 
377 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 6. In a sense, both modernism and 
postmodernism may misconceptualize the nature of truth. The former may be unduly 
optimistic in its identification of truth with progress, emancipation and autonomy. The 
latter unduly glib in its claim that truth is inaccessible. Truth may be domination, 
subordination and death. 
378 On this latter point, see Baudrillard, id. at 127 and F. Moretti, "The Spell of Indecision" 
in C. Nelson & L. Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana: 
University of Illinois, 1988) at 339. 
379 Schlag, "Normative", supra note 24. 
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3. (Un)Truth Revisited 
In order to escape the political quandary engendered by postmodemism' s 
embracement of a saturated subject awash in hyperreality, I would suggest 
that we can draw on, but adapt to the present context, the work of the 
sociologist Margrit Eichler. In relation to issues of gender, Eichler argues 
that in a world based upon (male) domination, we cannot know what 
(gender) equality might look like, and consequently, we should refocus our 
sights on what we do know, namely inequality, and make our task one of 
modifying and minimizing these inequalities.380 Similarly, it can be argued 
that although we cannot know what pristine truth might look like, we can 
know those things that are manifestly untrue, and so our task becomes one 
of minimizing the pervasiveness of these untruths. And, as I have argued, 
it is clearly untrue that the fasting prisoners were merely "ordinary, decent, 
criminals." The motivations for their alleged crimes were manifestly 
political. 381 They were arrested, detained, interrogated, tried and convicted 
under a statute382 that characterized them as "terrorists" and defined 
380 M. Eichler, "The Elusive Ideal Defining Equality" (1988) Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 167. A 
homologous conceptual move is made by Shklar in relation to the idea of justice when 
she argues that "we simply cannot know enough about men (sic) or events to fulfil the 
demands of justice" and then proceeds to argue that we are a great deal more familiar 
with injustice and therefore that we should make our task the minimization of injustice. 
J. Shklar, "Giving Injustice its Due" (1989) 98 Yale L.J. 1135. There are also hints of 
such an approach in the recent work of the feminist postmodernist, J. Flax, "The End of 
Innocence", Theorize, supra note 52, 445 at 459. See also, B. Moore Jr. , The Social 
Bases of Obedience and Revolt (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
381 Sands, Skylark, supra note 1 .  
382 A study of these laws, commissioned by Amnesty International, summarized the impact 
as follows: 
It has been shown in the first two parts of this analysis how the emergency legislation 
· has affected every stage of the criminal justice process linked to the "Diplock" courts. 
The police and the army have been given extremely wide and de facto unchallengeable 
powers of arrest and detention. "Forceful", "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation is 
allowed, in which the right to silence is implicitly denied. Interrogation is not under 
effective (i.e., contemporaneous) judicial control; unlawful treatment of prisoners does 
not give rise to the remedy of habeas corpus. At no stage of the pre-trial proceedings 
has the defence any effective opportunity to challenge the prosecution case. The 
availability of bail is limited. At the trial, statements obtained by "oppressive" methods 
are admissible, as long as these methods did not amount to torture, or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, or unless there is evidence of physical ill-treatment. 
Trial by jury has been abolished: the single judge has taken over the function of the jury 
as tribunal of fact and "weighs" the evidence in a legal framework (set by himself) 
which is much less strict than in ordinary trials. In most cases the evidence against the 
accused consists solely of his own (alleged) confession made during police 
interrogation .  In such cases, the "weighing" of the evidence is in fact subsumed under 
the judge's ruling on the admissibility of the confession: confessions, once admitted as 
evidence, are not in practice tested further on their reliability. The scope of appellate 
review is limited, at least as regards the crucial issues of the exercise of judicial 
discretion in ruling on the admissibility of a confession, and of the "weighing" of 
confessions by the judge acting as tribunal of fact. 
A number of these aspects of the special system of criminal justice, such as the absence 
of safeguards against arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the non-availability of habeas 
corpus against unlawful treatment in custody, by themselves raise serious issues 
concerning human rights. But the analysis of the law has shown that, for the purpose of 
determining the fairness of trials in "Diplock" courts, the single most important issue 
regards the reliability of confessions obtained during interrogation. As was shown 
above: 
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terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends ."383 Their "confessions" 
were admitted in circumstances which allowed for physical abuse384 and 
their treatment in prison was politically motivated, particularly the 
beatings .385 More broadly, what is one to make of the fact that between 1969 
and 1980 the prison population of Northern Ireland increased by almost 
500%,386 except by acknowledging - as both a former Northern Ireland 
premier (Major Chichester Clark) and British Secretary of State (Reginald 
Maudling) have done - that the Northern Ireland and the British states ·are 
at "at war" with the IRA ?387 And finally, why else would the British 
government derogate from its responsibilities under the European 
Convention on Human Rightst88 In short, there is a radical 
- the rules on interrogation are not aimed at obtaining reliable confessions and indeed 
allow for methods of interrogation which can seriously affect their reliability; 
- the pre-trial investigation carried out on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
is not aimed at ensuring that only prima facie reliable confessions are tendered in 
evidence; 
- the tests applied by the judges in the "Diplock" courts in ruling on the admissibility 
of confessions do not as a rule extend beyond ensuring that confessions tendered in 
evidence by the prosecution were not obtained as a result of physical ill-treatment; 
- although these tests leave out many aspects of interrogation which can seriously 
affect the reliability of confessions, the courts in practice subsume their "weighing" 
of the reliability of a confession under their ruling on its admissibility. 
The "Diplock" courts convict in the vast majority of cases in which a confession 
(allegedly) made by the accused in the course of police interrogation is the only 
evidence of his guilt, as long as there was no evidence that physical ill-treatment (or 
worse) was used to obtain that confession. In doing so, the courts implicitly assume the 
reliability of confessions obtained as a result of interrogation in which such treatment 
did not occur. It was already pointed out that it is surprising, in view of the evidentiary 
problems arising out of the private nature of interrogation, that the courts so often hold 
that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that nothing untoward has occurred 
which might have affected the reliability of a con fession. 
But even if that is left aside, there must be serious doubt about the assumption that 
confessions obtained as a result of "forceful", "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation 
are reliable even if nothing untoward occurred. 
D. Korff, The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland: A Fair Trial? (Utrecht : Netherlands 
Institute for Human Rights, I 984) 77-78. 
383 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, supra note 142, s.28. 
384 Supra note 147. 
385 For an account of the beatings see e.g., Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 279. For a 
close documentation see e.g., Feldman, supra note 138 at 147-217. 
386 Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at xi. The actual figures are: 1968: 727; 1970: 944; 
1974: 2,650; 1980: 2,500. See also Feldman, supra note 138 at 148-149; T. Hadden, 
"Who are the Terrorists?", Fortnight 6 (7 May 1976). 
387 Clark said, "Northern Ireland is at war with the Irish Republican Army Provisionals" and 
Maudling stated that the British government was "now in a state of open war with the 
IRA," quoted in Feehan, supra note 166 at 68-69. 
388 Britain has, on several occasions, exercised its derogation powers under Article 15 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (supra note 232): 
( I )  In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligation under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law. 
(2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts 
of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph I )  and 7 shall be made under this 
provision. 
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which 
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incommensurability between the juridical construction of the prisoners as 
"odes" and the incontrovertible existence of a specifically tailored legal 
process that simply cannot fit within the frame of that legal construct. 
Thus, it seems to me that if we re-orient our inquiry from the quest for 
Truth, to the minimization of untruths, we can adopt the postmodern virtue 
of self-reflexivity and modesty without necessarily being forced to embrace 
its vice of being self undermining. 389 As Bernstein, echoing Habermas, 
points out, "[ v ]iolence and distortion may be uneliminable, but they can be 
diminished. "390 
C. Language and power 
The foregoing reflections on postmodemism and deconstruction, law and 
truth, agency and death also suggest a reconsideration of the relationship 
between language and power through an analysis of the politics of language. 
In recent years, a significant number of North American and European 
academics, each in their own way inspired by what is sometimes called "the 
interpretative tum", have begun to espouse a faith in the reconstructive 
potential of "discourse," "dialogue," or "conversation" as a way to mediate 
societal and juridical polarization. 391 In response, this article suggests that 
those who chase the hare of dialogic democracy have a relatively "shallow" 
conception of societal difference. Their optimism leads them to over­
emphasize the rehabilitative power of ."discourse," "interpretation" and 
"intersubjectivity" and, therefore, perhaps ironically, to underestimate just 
how profound "deep diversity" can be. Specifically, I would draw attention 
to the question of the politics of language in Ireland. 
Like every good colonial power, the British recognized the importance 
of eliminating local languages, because the erasure of language can play a 
it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of 
the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the 
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed. 
See 1955-1957 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 50 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1969 Y.B. 
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 72-74 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on 
H.R. 32 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 24-28 (Eur. 
Comm'n on Human Rights); 1975 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 18 (Eur. Comm. H.R.); 1978 
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 22 (Eur. Comm.H.R.). 
389 Indeed this shift of focus parallels, to some extent, Norris' recent attempts to argue that 
Derrida cannot be lodged in the same camp as the levelling and relativistic 
postmodernists because, in certain selected passages in his work, Derrida does posit that 
there are precise standards of interpretive truth such as argumentative rigour and 
consistency, Norris, "Afterward", Deconstruction, supra note 13 at 145-158. My point 
is that Britain's approach to the prisoners is riddled with inconsistencies and therefore 
indefensible. 
390 Bernstein, supra note 113 at 205. 
391 See e.g., J.S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic 
Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); J. Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, (Boston: Beecon Press, 1984); R. Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) at 
373; M. Waltzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983); J.B. White, Justice as Translation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990); A. Cook, "Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr." ( 1990) l 03 Harv. L Rev. 985 al I 044. 
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vital role in the elimination of a culture. 392 Despite revivals, Irish has been 
relegated to a peripheral and ritualistic role in Irish society. However, at the 
very margins of the British state, in the prison camp - which at the same 
tiine represents Britain's colonial heart - many of the prisoners discovered 
the Irish language for the first time.393 Having come to terms with "jailic", 
they advanced with their programmes of political reflection and future 
vision.394 And more particularly, it was through their Irish language classes 
that they disinterred the pre-colonial Brehon law system, the practice of 
troscead and an alternative juridical langscape. But though they translated 
this juridical claim into English as "hunger strike", it was not understood as 
a legal claim because the jurisprudential and historical framework from 
which it emerged remained incomprehensible to the English juridical 
psyche. To say that something was lost in the translation would be an 
understatement. 
When legal cultures collide, it is not simply a conversation and the 
exchange of mutually transparent interpretations.395 Law and politics are a 
great deal more messy than discoursing. Juridical "conversations", as Robert 
Cover reminds us, take place on "a plain of pain and death",396 and it is that 
reality that is the vital difference of law. To occult that distinction, to suggest 
that the assertion of legal rights is a matter of spelling it out, is to create a 
false sense of optimism for ·the achievement of solutions to what are 
frequently intractable problems of diversity. And the losers will be "the 
other", those who cannot - or will not - speak the dominant discourse. As 
Foucault comments, "the history which bears and determines us has the form 
of war rather than language."397 Moreover, to manifest an excessive faith in 
dialogue may, in fact, be to the disadvantage of those who are dispossessed 
because it may give rise to "a dictatorship of the articulate."398 Therefore, I 
would suggest that in relation to "jurispathic"399 legal cultures such as those 
of western liberal democratic societies, the hunger strike demonstrates the 
tragic extent to which the "other" will have to go to their identity. 
392 In 1492, Antonio de Nebrija is reported to have justified his Gramatica to Queen 
Isabella of Spain on the basis that "(l)anguage is the perfect instrument of empire." See 
Williams supra note 7 at 74. 
393 It might be noted here, in support of the earlier argument as to the importance of agency, 
that the prisoners used their feces-covered walls as a type of "chalkboard" when learning 
to speak and write Gaelic. Sands, Life, supra note 157 at 53. It has also been reported, 
in order to challenge the glum monotony of the cells, one prisoner created patterns with 
his feces: of palm trees! Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at 209. 
394 Sands, "Training Camp", Skylark, supra note I at 150. 
395 To be clear, my point is not that the struggle over the meaning of signifiers is 
unimportant. Certainly, there is no doubt the difference between "ode" and "hac" on the 
one hand, and "political prisoners" and "freedom fighters" on the other, is strategically 
essential. It is just that political engagement requires more than the power to determine 
the terms of discursive practice. As Marx notes, "(m)aterial force can only be overthrown 
by material force", F. Bender, ed., Karl Marx: The Essential Writings 47 (Boulder: 
Westview, 1986). 
396 R. Cover, "Violence and the Word" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1601. 
397 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, /972-1977 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 114. 
398 W. Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality" ( 1989) 99 Ethics 883 at 
900. 
399 Cover, supra note 23 at 16. 
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D. Identity Politics and Postmodernism400 
For some who subscribe to postmodemism and deconstruction, my 
foregoing criticisms may appear to deradicalize and domesticate · the 
subversive insights of these approaches.401 More importantly, it might be 
suggested that this essay is premised upon a vision - my espousal of a 
jurisprudence that is based upon the identity politics of Irish nationalism -
that is subject to the withering gaze of deconstruction. In short, I have sawn 
off the branch upon which I am sitting. 
In other words, it might be argued that, insofar as my conception of 
jurisprudence converts a "conception of identity into a ground of 
politics",402 it is necessarily subject to the deconstructive insight that such 
a strategy is dependent on a point of contradiction: in this case the British 
law. Deconstruction, I am likely to be reminded, demands more than a 
simple reversal of hierarchy for that merely reproduces binarism without 
subverting the very concept of hierarchy; displacement engenders a 
multiplicity that cannot be reduced to (nationalist) identity.403 It may be 
argued that the valorization of identity - an Irish jural other -
reinforces and perpetuates the very system of domination that it seeks to 
transgress - British juridical colonialism - achieving what Schlag 
suggests is only a "suicidal reinscription of precisely the sort of 
hierarchical dualities . . . that deconstruction seeks to subvert and dis­
place. "404 Moreover, given postmodernism's commitment to anti-essential­
ism, the very idea of an Irish identity is (in its best light) a delusive 
artifact, a quaint ethnocentric sentimentality, and therefore incapable of 
bearing the juridical weight that I would wish to impose upon it.405 In its 
worst light, identity jurisprudence smacks of "national aestheticism" and 
a zealous patriotism that, historically, has done more harm than good.406 
400 Alexandra Dobrowolsky has encouraged me to think about the relationship between law, 
postmodemism and identity, see e.g., A. Dobrowolsky, The Stakes of Struggle: 
Democracy, Constitutionalism and Collective Actors in Canada ( 1992) [ unpublished] 
[hereinafter Stakes]; A. Dobrowolsky, "The Charter and Mainstream Political Science: 
Waves of Practical Contestation and Changing Theoretical Currents" in K. Sutherland 
& D. Schneiderman, eds., Charting the Consequences: Impact of the Charter of Rights 
on law and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). 
401 See e.g., "Le Hors", supra note 24. 
402 J. Butler, "Gender Trouble: Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse" in Fraser 
& Nicholson, supra note 65, 324 at 327. 
403 For an uncompromising analysis and rejection of Derrida's deconstruction of Jewish 
identity politics, see Binder, supra note 20 at 1372-1383. 
404 "Le Hors", supra note 24 at 1649. 
405 Baudrillard might formulate the criticism differently. He would probably argue that 
identity politics is a form of representational politics, but in a world of simulacra there 
is no origin to re-present, for we subjects are always already reproduced. 
406 As Mohr argues: 
Much of what has been termed postmodern has been viewed as destructive and 
nihilistic. The pathway barely sketched here examines only what ought to be clear in 
any case, that the overwhelming amount of the nihilism and destructiveness in this 
century arose from the notion of sovereignty, the legally constituted national state. 
Despite this experience, we are still a long way from being able to resist the seduction 
to reconstitute this kind of state and the legal form that is said to flow from it, but in 
fact makes its nihilism possible. One ought to rejoice when such efforts are rejected 
by the majority of a people, even if the reasons given for their negation sound awful. 
Mohr, supra note 24 at 379. See also, M. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle 
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By definition, identity constrains and excludes; therefore, what is required 
is "a liberation from identity."407 
In response to these potential arguments, three points might be made. 
First, although I recognize that identity politics is incapable of having an 
essentialist base, that does not mean that it is nothing, and it certainly 
does not mean that it is necessarily reactionary. Rather, we can recognize 
the inevitably artifactual nature of a perspective - and can even 
countenance the dynamic nature of such identities408 - but still operate 
in a self-reflexive and politically engaged way on the basis of such 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) at 8; R. Walker, One World, Many Worlds 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner, I 988); J.H. Miller, "Deconstruction and Cultural Criticism" 
(1991) 13 Cardoza L Rev. 1255. See also Derrida's critique of the "desire for Kingdom" 
supra note 281. 
407 N. Fraser, "False Antithesis: A reply to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler" (199 1 )  I I  
Praxis International 166, 175. The issue of identity politics has come to the fore most 
notably in relation to issues of gender and, in particular, the feminist tendency to rely 
on the category of "woman" as a basis for their critique of partriachal power and the 
quest for gender equality. Derrida, for example, perturbed by the tendency for 
distributing "sexual identity cards", Derrida & C. McDonald, "Choreographies" (1982) 
12:2 Diacritics 66, 69, has argued that such an espousal of identity not only operates as 
a mere inversion and therefore a failure to displace, but also smacks of essentialism and 
naturalism: 
Perhaps ... the "woman" is not a determinable identity. Perhaps woman is not some 
thing which announces itself from a distance, at a distance from some other thing .... 
Perhaps woman - a non-identity, a non-figure, a simulacrum - is distance's very 
chasm, the out-distancing of distance, the interval's cadence, distance itself.. .. 
Feminism is nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man. And 
in order to resemble the masculine dogmatic philosopher this woman lays claim -
just as much claim as he - to truth, science and objectivity in all their castrated 
delusions of virility. Feminism that seeks to castrate. 
J. Derrida, Spurs: Nietzche's Styles - Eperons: Les styles de Nietzsche, trans. B. Harlow 
(Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978) at 49, 65. 
Subsequently, he has cooled the rhetoric but re-asserted the same point: 
This is the risk. The effect of the Law is to build the structure of the subject, and as 
soon as you say, "well, the woman. is subject and this subject deserves equal rights," 
and so on - then you are caught in the logic of phallogocentrism and you have 
rebuilt the empire of the Law. So it seems that women's studies can't go very far if 
it does not deconstruct the philosophical framework of this situation, starting with the 
notion of subject, of ego, of consciousness, soul and body, and so on. 
Quoted in S. Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Post-modem Feminism 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, I 990) at 68. 
Such positions have generated critiques from several feminists who argue that a (suitably 
revised) category of "woman" is absolutely necessary to ground feminist praxis. See e.g., 
L. Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist 
Theory" in M. Malson et al, Feminist Theory in Practice and Process 295, 322 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); C. Di Stephano, "Dilemmas of Difference: 
Feminism, Modernity and Postmodemism" in Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 65, 63, 
75-76. For a defence of Derrida by a feminist, see D. Cornell, Beyond, supra note 19 at 
77-117. 
408 For an attempt to make this Jype of argument in relation to gender identity see, T. 
Delaurentis, Feminist Studies/Critical Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1986) at 8 .  See also, Alcoffs concept of "positionality" which conceives of "human 
subjectivity as an emergent property of a historized experience", where identity is 
"relative to a constantly shifting context, to a situation that includes a network of 
elements involving others, the objective economic conditions, cultural and political 
institutions and ideologies and so on", Alco ff, id. 407 at 321, 323. 
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identities. Irish Republicanism of the 1970s and 1980s may illustrate this. 
As I have indicated previously,409 in the 1970s and particularly within the 
"Republican university", Long Kesh, Republicanism underwent a 
significant transition from being militaristic and abstentionist in its 
orientation, to becoming politically participatory and self-consciously 
socialist. This transformation of identity was confirmed at the Ard Fheis 
(Annual Conference) of Sinn Fein in 1985 when the political and 
ideological leadership of the organization was transferred from the 
conservative purists of the south of Ireland to the leftist pragmatists of the 
north of Ireland.410 To argue that identity has no natural, essential or 
absolute significance, to accept the impossibility of "a rigorously pure 
self-identity"4 1 1  does not necessarily commit one to the sclerotic claims 
that identity politics is misconceived or that it is a simple reaffirmation 
of vulgar traditionalism. It simply allows us to recognize that difference 
and identity are constitutively interlocking, to be conscious of the 
inevitability of political change, and to forewarn us not to expect or 
impose closure. Nationalism, no less than law or language, is a protean 
and contested terrain, with both negative and positive implications.4 1 2  
The second point relates to empowerment. Postmodernist reservations 
about identity politics are intertwined with its conception of the subject. 
It is argued that because the self is constructed to the core it is a mistaken 
essentialist quest to seek out an identity. Rather, the subject may have 
multiple and often potentially conflicting identities that are so fluid and 
unstable that they cannot be constrained within, for example, a nationalist 
identity. This is an important insight into the complexity of subjecthood. 
However, I fear that it can potentially lead to a radically individualized 
politico-ontology in which there is an excessive focus on each person's  
particular circumstances. If  so, this might well have the effect of 
marginalizing the group aspects of a person's identity thereby fostering 
singularity rather than solidarity.413 As a consequence, postmodemism may 
devalue that aspect of ourselves that many value highly: our group 
membership.414 For the subordinated this experience of group identity may 
act as a form of empowerment and solidarity.415 Once again the H Blocks 
409 Supra note 136. 
410 Clarke, supra note 154. 
411 Ryan, supra note 171 at 10. 
412 Furthermore, it might also be noted that recently (Sept. 1994) and after 25 years of "the 
troubles" the IRA and Sinn Fein have gone even further in their restructuring of Irish 
republicanism by unilaterally declaring a ceasefire. Gerry Adams has been a central 
player in this re-orientation of Irish nationalism. For similar attempts to rethink identity 
see Dobrowolsky, Stakes, supra note 400 at 12;  D. Boyarin & J. Boyarin, "Diaspora: 
Generation and The Ground of Jewish Identity" (1993) 17 Critical Inquiry 693. 
4 13  Stakes, supra note 400 at 1 1 -12. 
4 14 I.M. Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship" (1989) 99 Ethics 250 at 251. 
4 I 5 As Max Weber notes, "[f]reedom and democracy are possible only where the resolute· 
will of a nation not to allow itself to be ruled like sheep is permanently alive" in M. 
Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology ed. by H. Gerth & C.W. Mills, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1946) at 71. Barrington Moore suggests, "pure moral 
autonomy in the form of lone resistance to an apparently benign authority is very rare. 
With support from peers, on the other hand, the same kind of resistance increases 
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provide an example of how empowerment is achieved through what one 
commentator has described as "the solidarity of collective vocality",416 in 
this case, Gaelic. 
Third, and this is a more negative and clearly strategic argument, it is 
not as if identity politics is always the "chosen" terrain of struggle by the 
disempowered. Those who oppress do so, in part, because of the 
"identity" of "the other," because of differences in race, gender or 
nationality. The "criminalization" project of the British government was 
very much driven by the question of identity; by encoding the prisoners 
as criminals its aim was to efface the nationalist liberation context for 
their alleged acts. The protests and the fasts �ere an attempt to re-assert 
their Irish identity and their legal rights as prisoners of war on the basis 
of that identity. Identity politics can be operative not only when identity 
is explicitly invoked, but even when it is denied. In other words, identity 
is a terrain of political struggle that the oppressed simply cannot afford 
to abdicate. 
E. One Step Forward, One Step Back, One Step to the ... 
I find myself in a curious situation in this essay. On the one hand it 
seems that postmodemism and deconstruction - through their critiques 
of hierarchy, subordination and oppression - are analytically and 
strategically valuable in enabling dissidents to identify fissures that offer 
emancipatory potential in a dominant social order. On the other hand, 
postmodemism and deconstruction may undermine dissident practices by 
positing that they are but simulacra with no necessary connection to 
reality, truth or justice, or at least no connection that would make a 
difference. I only want to go part way, to acknowledge that postmodern­
ism and deconstruction can be forms of resistance417 but without having 
to purchase their unremitting guardedness. I want to employ their insights 
as modes of politico-juridical analysis to facilitate a reconfiguration of 
Anglo-Irish relations, to deconstruct Britain's juridical hegemony. How­
ever, as Linda Hutcheon says of feminist encounters with postmodernism, 
"exposition may be the first step; but it cannot be the last."4 18 
To maintain this position, and to avoid this sense of one step forward, 
one step back, it will be necessary (as a preliminary move) to draw a 
distinction between postmodernism as a political philosophy and decon­
struction as a method of interpretation. By means of this disassociation it 
may be possible to argue that an embracement of deconstruction as a 
mode of analysis does not require a correlative commitment to 
enormously .... What the data reveal is the significance of social support for correct moral 
reasoning", Moore, supra note 321 at 97. See also, Fantasia, supra note 202. 
416 Feldman, supra note 138 at 216-217. For accounts of the importance of group solidarity 
in maintaining the "dirty protest", see Sands, life, supra note 157, and Clarke, supra 
note 154 at 78, 122. 
417 H. Foster, Re-Codings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay 
Press, 1985) xii at I 21. See also, S .  Lash, Sociology of Postmodernism (London, 
England: Routledge, 1990) at 37, 52 distinguishing between "mainstream" or 
"reactionary" postmodernism, and "oppositional" or "progressive" postmodernism. 
4 I 8 Hutcheon, supra note 376 at 152-153. 
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postmodemism with its eschewal of political practice and its predilection 
for relentless sceptical indifference.419 It is the spectre of Baudrillard that 
makes me hesitate. In a discussion that has haunting relevance to the 
concerns raised by this article he argues: 
If being nihilist is to take, to the unendurable limit of the hegemonic 
systems, this radic:al act of derision and violence, this challenge, which the 
system is summoned to respond to by its own death, then I am a terrorist 
and a nihilist in theory as others are through arms. Theoretical violence, not 
truth, is the sole expedient remaining to us. 
But this is a utopia. For it would be admirable to be a nihilist, if radicality 
still existed - as it would be admirable to be a terrorist if death, including 
that of the terrorist, still had meaning. 
But this is where things become insoluble. For opposed to this nihilism of 
radicality is the system's own, the nihilism of neutralisation. The system 
itself is also nihilist, in the sense that it has the power to reverse everything 
in indifferentiation, including that which denies it.420 
This, I think, goes too far. Beyond being a hyperbolic academic 
appropriation of experiences, discourses and practices of "terrorists", it 
callously undermines the final hopes of those who seek to resist in what 
appear to be impossibly oppressive conditions. It overemphasizes the 
power of contemporary social structures and underanalyses the potential 
for transgressive praxis. 
However, an uncoupling of postrnodemism and deconstruction is only 
a first step. In order to avoid the conclusion that death by fasting has no 
meaning, it seems to me that it is not enough to simply trash Baudrillard, 
for that may only be a form of scapegoating for a tendency that is latent 
in a deconstructionist mode of analysis. Therefore, as a second step, de­
construction, too, will have to be reconsidered, dereified and deflated. It 
must be shorn of its pretensions to be "a general law" ,421 a generalization 
"without present or perceptible limit",422 "a general, theoretical and sys­
tematic strategy"423 or a canonized cognate of "justice."424 Regardless of 
what Derrida - the author - might say,425 deconstruction itself is prob-
419 I gain some support for this strategy in the work of Christopher Norris. See e.g., Norris, 
Postmodernism, supra note 370 at 52; and Norris, Deconstruction, supra note 13 at 148-
156. 
420 J. Baudrillard, "On Nihilism", (1984) 6 On The Beach 38. 
421 Derrida, Margins, supra note 99 at 15. 
422 Derrida, Beyond, supra note 25 at 167-168. 
423 Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 68. 
424 Derrida, "Force", supra note 10 at 945. 
425 Consider, for example, that Derrida, in faithful reified deference, argues that, 
"deconstruction ... has never presented itself as a method .... " Beyond, supra note 25 at 
168. Or again, his proposition that : 
Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not wait the deliberation, 
consciousness or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It deconstructs itself. 
It can be deconstructed. 
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ably best understood as a rigorous methodology426 that enables one to 
critically interrogate those propositions that aspire to be universal, 
authoritative and incontrovertible; to demonstrate how they are, in fact, 
contingent, ambiguous and contestable. In this way, deconstruction can 
expose the pervasiveness of power rather than reason. And that, I believe, 
is productive. 
VI. (In) Conclusion 
For some, particularly those of a conservative and repressive political 
bent, my re-presentation and revalorization of the marginalized fasting 
prisoners as having a well founded jurisgenerative claim will reconfirm 
the moral bankruptcy of postmodern analyses. For such critics it will 
appear that added to the disreputable pantheon of Neitzsche the totalitarian 
"proto-Nazi", Heidegger the "Nazi",427 and Paul De Man "a Nazi 
collaborationist, ... propagandist"428 and "antisemite",429 is Bobby Sands the 
"terrorist criminal." 
Two responses may be appropriate to such a challenge. The first is a 
clarification of my argument; the second, is to destabilize conceit and to 
parry the reproach of immorality. First, conservative moralism misses the 
point. This essay (as part of a larger enterprise to construct a critical 
consciousness and articulate a radical jurisprudence) takes as its starting 
point the problem of human suffering, and has as its end point the 
diminution of such suffering. It is an attempt to disempower the em­
powered, and to juridically empower the disempowered as they struggle 
against domination. Consequently, the article is neither an attempt to 
legitimize the military campaign of the IRA against the continued British 
occupation of Ireland, nor the installation of yet more heroes in the 
pantheon of Irish martyrdom. Rather, I have considered how the 
repressive state apparatuses operate at a pervasive ideological level to 
impose one interpretation through the erasure of another, and to illustrate 
how those who would appear to be almost completely disempowered can 
resist, struggle and re-affirm their agency. Law, I have argued, is an 
integral element in this struggle between colonization and decolonization. 
My aim (as a member of the Irish diaspora) has been to re-present the 
unpresentable, to argue that the prisoners quite literally embodied law, and 
thereby, to facilitate "the return of the repressed."430 
J. Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend" in R. Bernasconi & D. Wood, eds., Derrida and 
Differance (Evanston, Fl.: Northwestern University Press, 1985) 1 at 4. 
426 See also, C. Norris, The Contest of the Faculties (New York: Methuen, 1985) at 18. 
427 For discussions see V. Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1989); R. Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and 
Politics: The Fichon of the Political (Oxford, England: B. Blackwell, 1990). 
428 A. Austin, "A Primer on Deconstructions 'Rhapsody of Word Plays'" (1992) 71 N.C.L 
Rev. 201, 212. 
429 D. Lehman, Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul De Man (New 
York: Poseidon Press, 1 991); W. Hamacher et al, eds., Responses: on Paul De Man's 
Wartime Journalism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). 
430 F. Jameson, Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991) at 199. 
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Second, it is important to confront the juridical smugness of moralistic 
conservatism head on. The assumption underlying such an approach is that 
law is the antithesis of violence. But, as I have argued elsewhere,431 
critical reflection requires a destabilization of "our" cherished convictions. 
This leads us to rethink law's position in the "economy of violence",432 in 
the "economy of death",433 and to recognize with Benjamin that "there is 
something rotten at the heart of law."434 As Ryan suggests: 
[t]errorism can be j udged to be outside the law only i f  the l aw is i tself 
deemed innocent and untouched by violence .... The recognition that one's 
own theoretical position is  contaminated by the practice one condemns 
removes the grounds of normative j udgment.435 
It is through vigilance, through the questioning of law itself, that 
jurisprudence can best fulfil its responsibility .436 
Viewed in this light, deconstruction and postmodernism can be 
understood as responsible practices. Insofar as they provide us with the 
critically empowering strategy of destabilizing preconceptions and pre­
judices, they can allow for alterity and the possibility of the insurrection 
of "subjugated knowledges."437 My turn to postmodernism and 
deconstruction is designed to generate an "impudent" re-reading of events 
in British occupied Northern Ireland, to articulate a radical alterity. As 
Derrida quips, "(t)he fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. _We 
may even see in this a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical 
progress."438 My aim has been to hang on to the critical Derridean 
proposition that we try: 
to recognize and analyze [violence] as best we can in  its various forms: 
obvious or disguised, i nstitutional or i ndividual, l iteral o r  metaphoric, 
431 Devlin, "Law's Centaur", supra note 8. 
432 "Violence and Metaphysics" in Writing, supra note 107 at 117. 
433 Margins, supra note 99 at 4; Writing, supra note 107 at 102. 
434 Supra note 284 at 286. 
435 Ryan, supra note 171 at 121. 
436 A third point may also be worth addressing: the question whether Sands was a 
"terrorist"? The debate as to whether dissidents like Sands are "terrorists" or "freedom 
fighters" is perennial and probably irresolvable. What is of greater importance are the 
circumstances of Sands' imprisonment. Between 1972, when he was eighteen, and his 
death at the age of twenty seven in 198 1, Sands spent all but six months of that time in 
jail. The first arrest and imprisonment was made on the basis of some guns that were 
found in a house where he was staying. No evidence was adduced to demonstrate that 
he knew about, or had ever been in contact with, these weapons. For this he spent three 
years in Long Kesh with political prisoner status. Six months after his release, he was 
re-arrested, this time for allegedly being involved in a bombing operation. The judge 
found that there was no evidence linking Sands to the bombing. However, because one 
revolver was found in a car in which Sands and several others had been travelling at the 
time of the arrest, the judge gave each of them fourteen years - fifty six in total - for 
possession of one revolver. On both occasions, Sands only "crime" was possession of 
firearms in what were hardly clear-cut circumstances. 
437 B. Hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender and Politics (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990) at 
8. 
438 Derrida, "Force", supra note 10 at 943-945. 
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candid or hypocritical, in good or guilty conscience. And if, as I believe, 
violence remains in fact (almost) ineradicable, its analysis and the most 
refined, ingenious account of its conditions will be the least violent 
gestures, perhaps even non-violent, and in any case those which contribute 
most to transforming the legal-ethical-political rules . . . .  439 
And yet, at the same time, I have felt a significant circumspection in the 
embracement of postmodemism. In its reluctance to engage with concrete 
social relations,440 in the fickleness of its "paralogic" conception of 
justice,441 and its misdiagnosis that "law and order themselves might really 
be nothing more than a simulation",442 it can leave us disempowered in 
our attempts to modify oppression, enraptured and ensnared by its own 
theoretical purity. 
To paraphrase an (Italian) political prisoner: as against the (French) 
"pessimism of the inteiligence" of an unmodified postmodemism and 
deconstruction, the story of the hunger strike illustrates an (Irish) 
"optimism of the will."443 
439 J. Derrida, limited Inc. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1989) at 112. 
440 Supra, Part V, A. 
44 1 Lyotard, Condition, supra note 19 at 60. 
442 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 38. 
443 A. Gramsci, Selections From Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 
1977) at 175. 

